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VIII.

RELATIONS BETWEEN NEUTRAL AND
BELLIGERENT STATES IN NAVAL WARFARE
A. THE CONCEPT OF NEUTRALITY

Under general international law states that refrain from participating
in war occupy a status of neutrality. As a consequence of such nonparticipation international law imposes duties and confers rights upon both
neutral and belligerent, and the law of neutrality comprises the totality
of the duties imposed and the rights conferred upon participants and nonparticipants. It is to be observed, then, that although neutrality may be
defined simply as the status of non-participation in war, the legal significance of such non-participation must be seen in the fact that it brings into
operation numerous rules whose purpose is the regulation of neutral-belligerent relations. Not infrequently, however, these rules-the consequence
of non-participation-have been identified with neutrality itself. In
particular, there has long been a widespread tendency to identify neutrality
with the principle of impartiality.
In a sense, the identification of neutrality with the various duties imposed
upon non-participants, and especially with the duty of impartiality, is
readily understandable. The principle of impartiality stands at the very
summit of the duties imposed upon non-participants. Nevertheless, it is
submitted that this identification of neutrality with the duties imposed by
general international law upon non-participants leads-both in theory and
practice-to certain difficulties and ought to be avoided. 1 Instead, neu1

In the preceding volume published in this series (Hans Kelsen, Collective Security Under International Law, pp. 141-4) the endeavor has been made to examine and to criticize the usual
identification of neutrality with the consequences traditionally attached to the status of nonparticipation in hostilities. Professor Kelsen has observed that the earlier Hague Con_ventions
use the term neutrality somewhat indiscriminately to mean, among other things, both .a status
of non-participation in war and an attitude of impartiality on the part of non-participants.
It is further observed that writers, too, have been frequently indiscriminate in their use of the
term. Professor Kelsen has concluded, correctly it is believed, that the way to avoid ambiguity
and confusion "is to understand neutrality as nothing else but the status of a state which i~
not involved in a war between other states, and impartiality as the principle according to
which a neutral state shall fulfill the obligations and exercise the rights, which a neutral sta~e
has under general international law, equally towards all other belligerents."
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trality may be considered simply as the status of states which refrain from
participation in hostilities. (Put in a slightly different manner, the only
essential condition for neutral status is that of non-participation in hostilities.) It is-of course-quite true that as a result of non-participation
in war general international law imposes certain duties and confers certain
rights upon non-participants, and that these duties and rights make up
what is commonly termed the traditional institution of neutrality. It is
equally true that a neutral state must carry out its duties and enforce its
rights in an impartial manner and that if the neutral state fails to do so the
belligerent made the object of discriminatory measures is no longer bound
to observe its duties toward the neutral. But so long as the neutral state
refrains from participating in the hostilities, so long as it refrains from
attacking one of the belligerents, and belligerents refrain from resorting
to war against the neutral, a status of neutrality is preserved. 2
These brief considerations would appear relevant in clarifying the legal
position of states which refrain from active participation in a war though
refusing to carry out the obligations imposed upon non-participants by
general international law-and particularly the obligation to remain
impartial toward the belligerents. In the absence of a treaty granting
non-participants the right to discriminate against one of the belligerents,
and obligating the belligerent to permit this discrimination, such departures as non-participants may take from duties otherwise imposed upon
them clearly afford belligerents the right to take appropriate measures of
reprisal. Thus in pursuing discriminatory measures against the Axis
Powers in 1940-41 the United States departed from its duties as a neutral,
and insofar as these measures could not be justified on the basis of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact 3 they furnished the Axis Powers with sufficient
2

See Law of Naval Warfare, Section 2.30. The objection may be made to the identification of
neutrality with non-participation in war that it suffers from a lack of precision, that it fails to
indicate what "non-participation" signifies in law. The history of "neutrality" indicates
that the status of "non-participation" has been regarded as compatible with quite disparate
forms of behavior on the part of non-participants. Thus during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries the passage of troops of one belligerent through the territory of a non-participant was
permitted. Mter the nineteenth century, however, this form of "benevolent" neutrality was
clearly forbidden to non-participants.-But this objection is not compelling. If anything, it
would appear to add further support to the view adopted here, since it only serves to emphasize that the one essential condition for neutrality has always been that of non-participation in
hostilities. It is, of course, quite true that the consequences of non-participation have varied
considerably, and that the non-participation of earlier times is something quite different from
the consequences attached to non-participation by the traditional or classic rules of neutrality
as they developed during the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However,
the identification of neutrality with non-participation in hostilities in no way denies this fact.
Nor does it obscure in any way the consequences still attached to a status of non-participation
according to general international law.
3 See pp. 166-70.
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reason for claiming the right to resort to reprisals. 4 But prior to its actual
entrance into hostilities as an active participant the United States retained
its status as a neutral state.
H the foregoing observations are accepted as correct then the legal significance of policies of" non-belligerency" becomes equally clear. It has
already been observed that to the extent that this term has not been used
merely as a synonym for the usual position occupied by non-participants
it has served to indicate varying degrees of departure from the duties traditionally consequent upon a status of non-participation in war. And
once again it is to be noted that in the absence of a treaty granting nonparticipants the right-and, perhaps, even the duty-to discriminate against
a belligerent, the failure of a neutral to observe the duties imposed upon
non-participants by the traditional law affords belligerents the right to
take measures of reprisal against the neutraL By abandoning its duties
the neutral thereby surrenders its right to demand from belligerents that
behavior which it would otherwise be entitled to claim. At the same time,
a neutral status is maintained so long as the ''non-belligerent'' refrains
from actively participating in the hostilities, either through attacking one
of the belligerents or through being attacked by a belligerent. In turn,
this must imply that the traditional duties and rights attending a status
of non-participation in hostilities continue to remain applicable. Nor does
it appear that the events of World War II-a period during which a number
There is no need to inquire here into the polidcal motives a state may have in departing
from the duties imposed upon it as a non-participant. In resorting to discriminatory measures
a state may claim that its vital interests are threatened by the course a war is taking. In part,
the justification for both the destroyer-base agreement with Great Britain and the LendLease Act (see p. 2.07(n)) rested upon considerations that may be regarded as devoid of proper
legal foundation. However, in testifying Qanuary 16, 1941) before Congress on behalf of
the then pending Lend-Lease Act, the Secretary of State declared chat although the provisions of the proposed act would admittedly lead to violations of established rules of neutrality
under "ordinary circumstances . . . we are not here dealing with an ordinary war situation.
Rather we are confronted with a situation that is extraordinary in character." U. S. Naval
War College, Int;,rnational Law Documents, I940, p. 109. In reviewing these same acts Hyde
(op. cit., pp. 2.2.34-7) also denies their character as violations of international law, contending
that a neutral need not establish "that inherently illegal action has been directed against
itself by the belligerent . . . before it can properly free itself from restrictions that normally
rest upon it . . . . " Hyde draws a distincdon between the "breach and the inapplicability
of particular rules of neutrality," concluding that the acts in question fell within the latter
category, their inapplicability following from the alleged right of a neutral to depart from
·
neutral duties in order to preserve what it considers to be its vital interests.
It is extremely difficult to accept this argument. According to general international law,
neutral departure from the duty of impartiality may be justified only as a reaction to the belligerent's violation of neutral rights. Even then, it seems correct to state that such measures of
reprisal must be taken against the offending belligerent and not take the form of assistance furnished
to the other belligerent. On the other hand, it is quite true that a neutral can disregard it~
duties as a non-participant if it considers its vital interests threatened-as the United States
obviously did so feel in 194o-41. But in so doing the neutral forfeits the right to demand
from the offended belligerent that behavior to which it would otherwise be entitled.
4
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of non-participants declared themselves to occupy a status of '' non-belligerency' '-provide substantial reason for suggesting any contrary conclusions. 5
B. THE

COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION
NEUTRALITY

OF

Unlike the law governing the mutual behavior of combatants, a large
part of which may be considered operative in any international armed conflict, 6 the rules regulating the behavior of neutrals and belligerents remain
excellent survey of World War II events in this regard is given by J. L. Kunz, ''Neutrality
and the European War 193_9-1940," Michigan Law Review, 39 (194o-41), pp. 747-54- Italy,
Turkey, Hungary and Spain-among other states-proclaimed a status of "non-belligerency."
Professor Kunz has concluded that the latter "has no foundation in law, is exclusively a political
creation. It appears in Protean forms: there are 'non-belligerents' who are practically neutral,
and 'neutrals' who are 'non-belligerents'; some states are 'non-belligerent' out of their own
free will, others more or less by coercion. _ 'Non-belligerency' ... is born out of the desire
to intervene under the name of non-intervention, to be in the war and yet not to be at war . . . .
While the 'non-belligerent' is fully aware that the disfavored belligerent has a right in law to
resort to reprisals or to a declaration of war, it is believed that from reasons of political expediency he will not do so" (pp. 753-4). The majority of writers concur with this position.
On the other hand, the assertion that the traditional law does not "recognize" or does not
attach "legal consequences" to a position of "non-belligerency" may prove somewhat misleading. The traditional law clearly does recognize this position, and precisely for the reason
that it does attach to it certain legal consequences (e. g., reprisals). In fact, it would seem
that what writers actually have in mind when they declare that the traditional law does not
recognize a condition of non-belligerency is that this law does not grant neutral states a right
to depart from the duties otherwise imposed upon non-participants, a right in the sense that
the injured belligerent is obliged to permit these acts and to refrain from taking reprisals.
It is, for example, in this sense that Stone (op. cit., p. 383) may be understood when he remarks
that: "The traditional law of neutrality confronts third states with only two choices, either to
join in the war or to observe the duties of impartiality. "-Furthermore, it is precisely the case
of so-called "non-belligerency" that provides a clear illustration of the m:ility of identifying
neutrality merely as the status of non-participation in hostilities. For although the "nonbelligerent" may discriminate openly against one of the belligerents (and thereby furnish the
latter with adequate cause for taking reprisals), it nevertheless retains a neutral status so long
as it does not enter into the hostilities. If, on the other hand, neutrality is identified with the
duty of impartiality then the discriminating non-participant must be regarded as not only
violating its duties under general international law buc as no longer neutral. The latter conclusion is obviously unwarranted, and its basis may be attributed to the insistence upon identifying neutrality with the principle of impartiality.-In this connection, however, it has been
observed that: "The notion of neutrality as merely non-involvement in direct hostilities is
inconsistent with the traditional concept, and if it should come to have this meaning, the concept would have been strikingly narrowed." Robert R. Wilson, "'Non-belligerency' in
Relation to the Terminology of Neutrality," A.]. I. L., 35 (1941), pp. 12.2.-3. But the "notion
of neutrality as mere non-involvement in hostilities" is not inconsistent with the traditional
concept. The inconsistency is rather between the duties attached by the traditional law to a
status of non-involvement in hostilities and the legally untenable contention that so-called
"non-belligerents" possess the right to depart from these duties, while remaining non-participants. This is indeed the crux of the matter, and the events of World War II can hardly be
considered as detracting from thi~ conclusion ,
6 See PP· 2.3-5·
5 An
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strictly dependent for their operation upon the existence of a state of war.
It may be, however, that states engaged in armed conflict are unwilling to
issue a declaration of war or even to acknowledge the existence of a state of
war. 7 In such situations it would appear that the decision as to whether
or not to recognize the existence of a state of war, and thereby to bring into
force the law of neutrality, must rest principally with third states. The
attitude of the parties engaged in armed conflict need not prove decisive for
third states, the latter being at liberty either to accept the position of the
contestants (i. e., the position that war does not exist) or to reject this
position and to invoke the law of neutrality. 8
Although it is customary for belligerents to notify third states of the outbreak of hostilities 9 the latter cannot rely on the absence of such notification as a justification for the non-performance of neutral duties if it is estab7 Thus both parties to the Sino-Japanese conflict of I937 refused to acknowledge the existence
of a state of war-though the Assembly of the League of Nations later found that Japan had
"resorted to war" in violation of her obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
s This, at least, would seem to be the only feasible solution to the difficult situation that may
arise in cases of undeclared hostilities. In practice, however, third states are likely to take
the position of the contestants at face value, since the rules of neutrality invariably operate to
restrict the behavior of non-participants-particularly with respect to trade. It is only to be
expected that third parties will normally desire to avoid bringing these restrictions into effect.
Distinguish, though, between the operation of the law of neutrality as determined by international law and the operation of municipal neutrality laws. The latter may be applied to
situations other than war in the sense of international law. Thus Section I (c) of the Neutrality
Act of May I, I937, declared that: "Whenever the President shall find that a state of civil strife
exists in a foreign State and that such civil strife is of a magnitude or is being conducted under
such conditions that the export of arms, ammunition, or implements of war from the United
States to such foreign State would threaten or endanger the peace of the United States, the
President shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export, or attempt to
export, or cause to be exported, arms, ammunition, or implements of war from any place in
the United States to such foreign State, or to any neutral State for transshipment to, or for the
use of, such foreign State." For text, see U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations,
I9J9, pp. IOI ff.
It should be observed that operation of the international law of neutrality presupposes, and
is dependent upon, the recognition of insurgents in a civil war as belligerents. Prior to such
recognition-whether by the parent state or by third states-there can be no condition of
belligerency, hence no neutrality in the sense of international law. Although third states may
grant any kind of material assistance to the parent government fighting insurrectionists, aid
to the latter amounts to intervention in the internal affairs of the parent state and is forbidden.
Of course, once the parent state recognizes the insurgents as belligerents, or once third states
so recognize the insurgents independent from any act of recognition by the parent ·state, the
civil war is transformed into an international war, and the rules of neutrality come into force.
For a survey of the problems arising in this regard, see H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International
Law (I947), Part III. And for U. S. practice, Hyde, op. cit., pp. 2.33o-5.
9 According to Article 2. of Hague III (I907), Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, a state
of war "must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay, and shall not take effect in regard
to them until after the receipt of a notification, which may even be given by telegraph. Neutr~l
Powers, nevertheless, cannot plead the absence of notification if it is e~tablished beyond doubt
that they were in fact a ware of the state of war."
·
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lished that knowledge of the commencement of w ar in fact existed. Third
states, in turn, are not required to issue special declarations proclaiming
their intention to refrain from participating in the war and to observe the
duties of a neutral state.
In practice, however, third states generally do issue, upon the outbreak
of war, neutrality declarations or proclamations that are directed not only
to their own officials and subjects but also to the belligerents. International law in laying down the scope of a neutral's duties and rights leaves
to the neutral state the task of fulfilling these duties and of exercising these
rights. Within the limits prescribed by international law the neutral
state may act at its discretion. It must regulate, in various ways, the
behavior of individuals located within neutral jurisdiction. It must
decide, within the limits imposed by international law, upon the use it is
to allow belligerents of its waters and ports. Thus the neutral state may
choose to allow the use of its waters and ports up to the limits prescribed
by international law; but it may choose to place severe restrictions upon
the entrance and stay of belligerent warships. Still further, the neutral
state may desire to place restrictions upon the activities of its subjectsparticularly with respect to trading with belligerents-in excess of any
requirements laid upon the neutral state by internationallaw. 10 Neutrality
declarations form a practical necessity, therefore, not only for the information of the officials and the subjects of the neutral state but for the information of belligerents as well. 11
As did the United States in its Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1937 and 1939 (seep. 2.1o(n)).
It is for the reasons discussed above that the preamble to Hague Convention XIII (1907)
declares that "it is desirable that the powers should issue detailed enactments to regulate the
results of the attitude of neutrality when adopted by them." An invaluable collection of
neutrality legislation and declarations has been compiled by F. Deak and P. C. Jessup, A Collection of Neutralit;• Laws, Regulations and Treaties of Various Countries (1939)J 2. vols. (Neutrality
declarations issued by third states upon the outbreak of World War II are contained in a looseleaf supplement.)
In 1939, upon the commencement of hostilities in Europe, the majority of non-participating
states did issue neutrality declarations. For a general survey of World War II practice in this
regard, see J. L. Kunz, op. cit., pp. 72~32.. Hyde (op. cit., pp. 2.316-7) has described United
States practice in the following general terms: "Upon the outbreak of war, the executive issues
a so-called neutrality proclamation addressed primarily to persons 'residing or being within
the territory or jurisdiction of the United States.' By this means he endeavors to minimize
the danger of the commission of acts which, unless retarded, may either expose the Government
to the charge of neglect of its acknowledged duties as a neutral, or render their performance
more burdensome. To that end the proclamation calls attention (a) to the several acts which
the local statutory law prohibits; (b) to the decision of the executive as to the extent and
nature of the privileges to be accorded belligerent ships of war within American waters; and
(c) to the requirements of the law of nations as well as of the statutes and treaties of the United
States, that no person within its territory and jurisdiction 'shall take part, directly or indirectly
in the war. The individuals concerned are enjoined, moreover, to commit therein no act
contrary to the law whether national or international. A warning is appended as to the
impropriety of certain unneutral services on the high seas, and of the risks and penalties to
be anticipated in case of capture. American citizens and others claiming the protection of the
10

11
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The termination of neutral status presents no special difficulty, being
subject to essentially the same considerations as those determining the
commencement of neutrality. Just as there is no duty imposed by customary international law upon third states to refrain from participating in a
war that has once broken out, or for belligerents to respect a status of nonparticipation, so there is no duty either on the part of the neutral or on the
part of the belligerent to refrain from resorting to war against one another
at any time thereafter. It is one of the seeming paradoxes of the traditional law that it may be violated only by acts of neutral or belligerent
which fall short of war, though not by the act of resorting to war itself. 12
And even though it may now be contended that a belligerent is no longer
free to attack non-participants for whatever reasons it may deem desirable,
in vievv of the changes-earlier discussed 13-in the legal position of war,
there is no doubt that if a non-participant has been so attacked the status
of neutrality has come to an end.

C. THE NEUTRAL'S DUTY OF IMPARTIALITY
Among the duties imposed upon non-participants by the traditional
system the duty of impartiality occupies a central position. 14 Despite its
Government, 'who may misconduct themselves in the premises,' are informed that they can
in no wise obtain any protection from the United States 'against the consequences of their
misconduct."' Upon the outbreak of war in September, 1939, the President issued, on September 5, 1939, two proclamations of neutrality. The first, a "general neutrality proclamation,"
outlined those acts forbidden within the jurisdiction of the United States. The proclamation
was based upon the rules and procedure of international law as well as upon domestic statutes
in conformity with these rules. The second, a "special" neutrality proclamation, was based
upon the Neutrality Act of May r, 1937, later replaced by the Neutrality Act of November
4' 1939·
12 For a clear presentation of this and related aspects of the traditional institution of neutrality
see J. L. Kunz (K.riegsrecht und Neutralitatsrecht, pp. 2.14 ff.) who properly emphasizes that as there
is no obligation under customary law to take up a neutral status at the commencement of war,
so there is no obligation to remain neutral for the duration of war. The same lack of obligation
applies, mutatis mutandis, in the relation of the belligerent to the neutral. Occasionally,
however, writers have refused to draw these conclusions, despite the fact that they constitute
the obvious consequences of the traditional status of war itself. Thus it has been stated that
in a war in which the rules governing neutral-belligerent relations are being observed, a neutral
ought not to abandon its status of non-participation "except for a reason not connected with
the cause of the war in progress, nor ought a belligerent to draw the neutral into the war."
To declare war "simply because it does not suit the belligerent any longer to recognize its
[neutral's] impartial attitude, or because it does not suit the neutral to remain neutral any
longer . . . ipso facto constitutes a violation of neutrality . . . . " Oppenheim-Luaterpacht,
op. cit., p. 671. But it is difficult to reconcile these and similar statements either with the traditional legal interpretation of war or with the traditional institution of neutrality.
13 See pp. 3-4, 165 ££.
14 Although the law of neutrality imposes duties and confers rights upon neutral and bellig-.
erent alike the focus of an inquiry into this law may perhaps best be centered around the
duties of the neutral. In brief, four general duties are imposed upon neutral states: the duty to
act impartially toward the belligerents; the duty to abstain from furnishing belligerents any
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admitted importance, however, the principle of impartiality has been a
frequent source of controversy and misunderstanding. 15 As a duty imposed
upon neutral states by the positive law the principle of impartiality may
be defined simply as obligating neutral states to fulfill their duties and to
exercise their rights in an equal (i. e., impartial or non-discriminatory)
manner toward all the belligerents. 16 Hence the principle of impartiality,
as a principle of the positive law, does not determine the contents of the
material assistance for the prosecution of war; the duty to prevent the commission of hostile
acts within neutral jurisdiction as well as to prevent the use of neutral jurisdiction ~s a base
for belligerent operations; and, finally, the duty to acquiesce in certain repressive measures
taken by belligerents against private neutral commerce on the high seas. Under these general
duties-which establish correlative rights of belligerents-may be grouped almost all the
specific obligations regulating the conduct of neutral states in naval warfare. The duties of a
neutral state may also be classified-and frequently are so classified-as duties of abstention,
prevention and acquiesence (or toleration). Duties of abstention refer to acts the neutral state
itself must refrain from performing; duties of prevention refer to acts the commission of which
within its jurisdiction the neutral is obligated to prevent; and, finally, duties of acquiescence
have reference to neutral obligations to permit belligerent measures of repression against neutral
subjects found rendering certain acts of assistance to an enemy.
It is also helpful to observe that the duties of a neutral correspond to the rights of a belligerent, and that the rights of a neutral correspond to the duties of a belligerent. The neutral's
duty to observe a strict impartiality corresponds to the belligerent's right to demand impartiality on the part of the neutral. At the same time, the neutral has a right to demand that
the belligerent will act toward it in such a manner as to respect its position of impartiality,
and there is no question but that the belligerent is under a duty to do so. A similar analysis
applies, for example, to the neutral's duty to prevent its wners and ports from being used as a
base for belligerent operations. Here again, the belligerent though having a right to demand
that neutrals not permit their waters and ports from being so used, also has a duty to respect
these waters and ports. Conversely the neutral, though having a duty, also has a right to
demand that its waters and ports not be used by belligerents as a base of operations.
15 In large measure, this controversy would appear to stem from a failure to distinguish with
sufficient clarity between impartiality in the sense of a moral-political postulate and impartiality in the sense of a duty imposed upon neutral states by the positive law. Historically,
the significance of the idea that neutrals should occupy a position of impartiality toward the
belligerents has been considerable. Elsewhere (see pp. 191-2.), emphasis has been placed upon
the degree to which the attitude of impartiality-and even of indifference-toward the belligerents formed part of the political structure upon which the traditional law of neutrality
depended for its effectiveness during the nineteenth century. At the same time, it is a mistake
to believe that the rules regulating the status of non-participants represent the "logical"
application of the conviction that neutrals ought to behave impartially. It is hardly possible
to derive from this conviction-as a moral-political postulate-the specific rules of the positive
law regulating the conduct of neutral states, if only for the reason that the law of neutrality
is the product of other factors as well (not the least of which has been the perennial conflict
of interest between neutral and belligerent, and the sheer necessity for reaching a compromise
as between these conflicting interests).
16 The preamble to Hague Convention XIII (1907) declares that "it is, for neutral Powers,
an admitted duty to apply these rules impartially to the several belligerents." And Article 9
of the same Convention reads: "A neutral Power must apply impartially to the two belligerents
the conditions, restrictions or prohibitions made by it in regard to the admission into its ports,
roadsteads, or territorial waters, of belligerent warships or of their prizes." A brief, though
excellent~ discussion of the neutral duty of impartiality is contained in Harvard Research in
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duties imposed and the rights conferred upon neutrals. 17 The impartiality
demanded by the traditional law of neutrality does not even relate directly
to the contents of other neutral obligations and rights, but to the manner
in which these obligations and rights shall be applied.
Nor does the neutral's duty of impartiality require that the measures a
neutral must-or may-take bear with equal effect upon the belligerents.
It is entirely possible-and in many instances almost inevitable-that the
strict fulfillment by a neutral of its obligations will result in the greater
discomfort and disadvantage of one side in a war. A belligerent has not,
for this reason, ligitimate cause for complaint. 18 Even more possible is
the unequal effect upon belligerents that may result from the exercise of
neutral rights. Thus a neutral state in the exercise of its right to place
special restrictions upon the belligerents' use of its waters and ports is
obligated only to see that the restrictions it imposes are applied impartially.
The same may be said of the neutral state's privilege either to allow or to
restrict, or to forbid entirely, the export trade carried on by its nationals
with the belligerents. The fact that the exercise made of these neutral
rights thereby places one of the belligerents at a disadvantage with respect
to its opponent does not provide the disadvantaged belligerent with a lawful
basis for claiming that it has been made the object of discriminatory
measures.
Nor is it a violation of neutrality if, in the exercise of its rights, a neutral
state actually intends to confer an advantage upon one side. As already
observed, the traditional law of neutrality permits to neutrals a substantial
measure of discretion in determining whether or not to exercise their
International Law, Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War,
A.]. I. L., 2.2. (1939), Supp., pp. 2.32.-5. Article .4 of the Draft Convention reads: "A neutral
state, in the exercise of its neutral rights and in the performance of its neutral duties, shall be
impartial and shall refrain from discriminating between belligerents." And see Law of Naval
Warfare, Article 2.4ob.
17 But see the statement in Oppenheim-Lauterpacht (op. cit., p. 653): "Neutrality may be
defined as the attitude of impartiality adopted by third States towards belligerents and recognized by belligerents, such attitude creating rights and duties between the impartial states
and the belligerents." However, it is not the attitude of impartiality which "creates rights
and duties." It is rather the status of non-participation in war which creates rights and duties,
among which is the duty of impartiality.
18 "Impartiality is one of the essential features of neutrality.
But at the same time I must
emphasize very strongly . . . the fact that the statement that neutrality demands impartiality
means simply impartiality in the application of law; it rarely ever results in impartiality in
operation. International law imposes certain obligations upon a neutral nation ~hich it
must perform with reference to each belligerent in a war; but international law does not impose
any obligation on a neutral to see that the performance of these obligations should operate
in the same manner on each belligerent. And, in fact, a neutral 0bligation rarely, if ever,
operates in the same manner on each belligerent.'' Statement by Charles Warren to the U. S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 5, 1936, cited in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol.
VII, p. 377· For equally clear statements to the same effect, see Kunz, op. cit., p. 2.q, and Vetdross, Volkerrecht, p. 412..
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rights . 19 Within this area of discretion neutral states necessarily will be
guided by considerations of policy, and the latter may dictate an exercise
of neutral rights the result of which is intended to benefit one side in the
conflict. The frequent contention that such intent on the part of t he
neutral state is a violation of the neutral's duty of impartiality has no
foundation, however. The so-called'' attitude of impartiality'' demanded
of neutrals does not refer, in its strict legal meaning, to the political motives
behind neutral behavior, but to that behavior itself. H ence, it may w ell
be that in the exercise of its rights the neutral state both intends to confer
and does in fact confer an advantage upon one side. In doing so it does not
depart from the duty of impartiality so long as it refrains from discriminating against either belligerent in the actual application of those regulations
it is at liberty to enact. 20
It is to be observed, however, that the principle of impartiality cannot be interpreted as
restricting the operation of the duties othervyise imposed upon a neutral state. Thus a neutral
state is obligated to abstain from supplying belligerents with war materials and to prevent the
use of its territory as a base for the conduct of belligerent operations. The duties of abstention
and of prevention are violated even though the neutral state may act impartially in supplying
belligerents with war materials and in permitting the use of its territory as a base of operations.
In brief, the discretion allowed to a neutral does not pertain to the fulfillment of duties-though
the neutral may choose different ways in which to secure the fulfillment of its duties-but to
the exercise of rights.
20 It should also be apparent from these remarks that the impartiality required of a neutral
state does not obligate the latter to look upon the conflict with "indifference." The neutral
state may be-in spirit-wholly in sympathy with one side in the conflict, but as long as it actJ
in an impartial manner, in the sense described above, it fulfills its obligation.-The failure to
distinguish clearly between the various policies open to a neutral and the legal duties imposed
upon the latter characterized much of the debate over American neutrality during the years
prior to this country's entrance into World War II. This confusion of policy considerations
with legal principle was particularly apparent in the unfounded contention that the duty of
impartiality required not only the avoidance of any intent to confer an advantage upon one
side in the conflict (even though such advantage would be conferred as a result of the impartial
application of neutral rights) but also the adoption of measures that would insure the belligerents a factual equality of treatment.
In this connection brief note should be taken of the possible bearing the principle of impartiality may have upon the neutral's attempt to alter its laws and regulations during the course of
a war. When in November 1939 the United States modified certain features of its neutrality
legislation the question arose as to the compatibility of such change with the duty of impartiality. One of the principal effects of the Neutrality Act of November 4, 1939, was to remove
the earlier embargo placed on the sale to belligerents of arms, munitions and other implements
of war. In taking this action the United States removed a restriction which, as a neutral, it
need never have imposed. At the same time, the effect of the change-and, it was claimed, its
intent-was to aid the Allies. It is at least doubtful, however, whether the legitimacy of
such change as a neutral may make in its neutrality legislation during the course of a war can
be determined by reference to the principle of impartiality. Instead, it would appear that
attention must be directed toward establishing whether or not state practice does expressly
limit the neutral in this respect, quite apart from the principle of impartiality. From this
point of view the question is admittedly a close one, though there is much to be said for the
position expressed in the preamble to Hague XIII (1907), to the effect that the neutrality regulations issued by a neutral "should not, in principle be altered, in the course of the war . ..
19
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Finally, it must be emphasized that the duty of impartiality applies to
the acts of the neutral state (i. e., to the acts of organs or officials of the
neutral state) and not to the private acts of its subjects. Apart from certain
limited exceptions, 21 the neutral state is under no obligation to prevent its
subjects from giving material assistance to a belligerent, though it may
forbid such behavior should it so desire. Clearer still is the absence of
any duty imposed upon the neutral state to prevent its subjects from giving
moral assistance to, or expressing sympathy for, one side in the conflict. 22

D. THE NEUTRAL'S DUTY TO ABSTAIN FROM SUPPLYING
BELLIGERENTS WITH GOODS AND SERVICES
Together with the duty of impartiality, and of equal importance, is the
obligation laid upon neutrals by the traditional law to abstain from furnishing belligerents with certain goods ,or services. 23 In naval warfare a
except in a case where experience has shown the necessity for such change for the protection
of the rights of that (neutral) power. . . . " Certainly the United States took this position
during World War I in response to complaints by the Central Powers that this country ought
to place an embargo on the exportation of war implements to the Allies. The difficulty is in
ascertaining when a neutral does change its regulations ostensibly for the purpose of better
safeguarding its rights or fulfilling its duties, since it is commonly acknowledged that hereat least-change is permitted.
2t See PP· 227-3!.
22 For this reason the claim advanced by the Axis Powers during World War II, that neutral
states were obligated to prevent private expressions of sympathy or support for one belligerent,
was wholly devoid of support in law. Known variously as "total" or "ideological" neutrality
the essential features of this doctrine, as expounded by its leading protagonists, was to extend
the neutral's duties to the strict control of public opinion in time of war as well as in time of
peace. In particular, the neutral state was considered as obligated to maintain a rigid control
over the press and to insure its impartiality. See E. H. Bockhoff, "Ganze oder halbe Neutralidit," in Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte (1938), pp. 910 ff. Although the doctrine had
no basis in law, and was repudiated by a number of writers (e. g., Edward Hambro, "Ideologische Neutralitat," Zeitschrift fiir offentliches Recht, 19 (1939), pp. 502 ff. and J. L. Kunz,
"Neutrality and The European War," pp. 744-7), a number of neutral states did impose restrictions upon the freedom of private expressions of sympathy for one side. Distinguish, however,
between expressions of sympathy for a belligerent by the subjects of a neutral state and by the
organs or officials of the neutral government. Occasionally it has been asserted that even the
latter are compatible with a strict impartiality, though this is very doubtful. For United
States practice in this respect, see Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 374-7.
23 In formulating the neutral duty under immediate consideration it is tempting to give it a
broader scope than indicated above by stating that the neutral state is obliged to ab~tain from
furnishing any form of assistance to belligerents as would aid the latter in the prosecution of Wtfr. Many
writers formulate the neutral's duty in this manner. Nevertheless, this manner of formulation
is apt to prove somewhat misleading, particularly when applied to neutral duties in naval
warfare, if only for the reason that the use belligerents may make of neutral ports and waters
do constitute-save perhaps in the purely formal sense-a form of·assistance to belligeren~s.
It is, of course, always possible to assert that-by definition-a neutral state is forbidden to
render any assistance to belligerents as would aid the latter in the prosecution of war; heJ?.ce
the example of the various uses belligerents may make of neutral waters and ports cannot constitute-again by definition-assistance to belligerents. But this is surely a fiction, which can
hardly succeed in hiding the legal reality, and it would appear much more accurate merely to
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neutral state violates this duty if it provides belligerents with warships,
munitions, or war materials of any kind. 24 In this respect, Article 6 of
Hague Convention XIII (1907) declares that the "supply, in any manner,
directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power to a belligerent Power, of warships, ammunition, or war materials of any kind whatever, is forbidden." 25
Where the neutral state directly acts to sell, lend or otherwise furnish a
belligerent with" warships, munitions or war materials" the situation does
not admit of doubt. 26 Nor is the unlawful behavior of the neutral state
state-as a general principle-that neutrals are required to abstain from rendering certain
supplies or services to belligerents, whether directly or indirectly. In this connection it is of
interest to note that although Article 5 of the Harvard Draft Convention on The Rights and Duties
of Neutral Statu in Naval and Aerial War (op. cit., p. 2.35) declares that a neutral state "shall
abstain from supplying to a belligerent assistance for the prosecution of the war," the comment
to this Article emphasizes the "considerable difficulty in drafting an adequate article on this
subject. It has been found impossible to draft an article which would describe fully all the
types of aid which a State may not furnish to a belligerent. There may be at least indirect
types of aid which are permissible . . . . Thus •.. a neutral State may afford to belligerent
warships certain facilities in its ports . . . " (p. 2.3 7).
24 And, of course, if it provides belligerents with loans or credits.
25 The term "war materials" can hardly be interpreted other than in relation to the prevailing
conception of contraband (see pp. 2.63-7). In a war in which the articles considered to constitute
contraband have been greatly expanded, the goods a neutral state must abstain from furnishing
belligerents will be correspondingly expanded.
26 Thus when judged solely by the obligations imposed by Article 6 of Hague XIII, the transfer by the United States of over-age destroyers to Great Britain in 1940 was clearly a violation
of neutral duties. The same must be said of the Act to Promote the Defense of the United States,
approved March II, 1941-the so-called Lend-Lease Act. See U. S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, I940, pp. 74-91, 132.-7. Section 3 of the Lend-Lease Act declared:
"(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to
time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the
Secretary of the Navy or the head of any other department or agency of the Government(r) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise
procure, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized
from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for the government of any
country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States. (2.) To
sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government
any defense article . . . (3) To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise
to place in good working order, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor,
or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for
any such government, or to procure any or all such services by private contract. (4) To communicate to any such government any defense information, pertaining to any defense article
furnished to such government under paragraph (2.) of this subsection. (5) To release for export:
any defense article disposed of in any way under this subsection to any such government.''
Section 2. of the Act provided that: "The term 'defense article' means (1) any weapon,
munition, aircraft, vessel or boat; (2.) any machinery, facility, tool, material, or supply necessary
for the manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, or operation of any article
described in this subsection; (3) Any component material or part of or equipment for any article
described in this subsection; (4) Any agricultural, industrial or other commodity or article
for defense.''
But for a justification of the Lend-Lease Act and the destroyer-base agreement on grounds
other than those under immediate considera,tion, see pp. r68-9, r98(n)).
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altered in any way by the fact that the aid furnished by the neutral has as
its basis a trade agreement concluded prior to the outbreak of war. On the
other hand, the application of this neutral duty may not always be clear.
Difficult considerations frequently arise, for example, in the attempt to determine if and when a neutral state has acted" indirectly" to supply a belligerent with the sinews of war. Thus a neutral state may follow a policy of
encouraging the supply of war m.aterials to a belligerent through private
traders, while itself abstaining from any direct action. 27 In instances such
as these it may not be immediately apparent that the neutral state has
acted in violation of its obligations. In fact, the growth in the power of
the state has given rise to considerable difficulties in practice, and these
difficulties will be dealt with shortly. Here it is sufficient to emphasize
only the strict abstention from supplying belligerents with war materials
that is, in principle, required of neutral states.
This same duty of abstention setves to limit the behavior of the neutral
state in other respects as well. As Hyde has observed, "the duty to abstain from giving aid is a broad one and covers a vast field of governmental
activities;" for in addition to the prohibition against supplying belligerents
with war materials of any kind the neutral is obligated, in general, ''to
abstain from placing its various governmental agencies at the disposal of a
belligerent in such a way as to aid it directly or indirectly in the prosecution
of the war." 28 Thus in naval warfare, the public vessels of a neutral state
must refrain from rendering services of any kind to belligerent naval units
at sea. They must not act as supply vessels or tenders to belligerent warships, they must not serve as transports for carrying members of a belligerent's armed forces, they must not communicate any information to belligerent warships which would assist the latter in operations against an enemy,
and they must not interfere-in any manner-with the legitimate operations of belligerent warships. 29
27 During the first year of World War II the United States resorted to a policy of making war
materials owned by this Government available to Great Britain and France through the inter ..
mediary of private firms. Old stocks of arms and ammunition were turned back by the War
Department to private manufacturers who then sold them through the Allied Purchasing
Agency to the British and French Governments. Similar "trade in" agreements were carried
out with respect to aircraft. In examining these measures one observer has noted: "None of
these transactions appear to have been carried on directly between the United States and belligerent countries or their respective agencies. Yet it is clear that the purpose of the United
States Government . . . was to give all possible aid to Great Britain and France in the present
war, and these transactions appear to have been carried out in pursuance of that purpose, and
as a result of negotiation and concerted action." Lester H. Woolsey, "Government Traffic in
Contraband," A.]. I. L., 34 (1940), p. soo.
28 Hyde, op. cit., pp. 2.2.30-r.
29 There are certain acts of a humanitarian character, however, that neutral warships may
perform and that are not regarded as aiding a belligerent. The warships of a neutral state
may rescue ship-wrecked survivors from a belligerent warship, provided only th~t the neutral
prevents the survivors from participating again in hostilities. (See pp. 12.2.-3).
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It is one of the principal characteristics of the traditional system of
neutrality that whereas the neutral state is under the strict obligation to
abstain from furnishing belligerents with certain goods and services it is
normally under no obligation to prevent its subjects from undertaking to
perform these same acts of assistance. 30 With respect to trade in war
materials carried on by the subjects of a neutral state Article 7 of Hague
Convention XIII provides that a "neutral Power is not bound to prevent
the export or transit, for the use of either belligerent, of arms, ammunition,
or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or fleet.'' Occasionally, it is true, belligerents have questioned this absence of obligation
on the part of the neutral state, especially when the export of war materials
by private individuals has served to confer-jn fact-a decided advantage
upon one side. Thus, during World War I the Central Powers complained
to the United States that the volume of traffic in arms and munitions being
exported from this country to the Allies had reached such large proportions,
and conferred so decided an advantage upon one side, as to raise the question
whether the continuance of this traffic could be regarded as compatible
with the obligations imposed upon a neutral state-and particularly with
the obligation to observe a strict impartiality toward the belligerents. In
rejecting the suggestion that an embargo be placed upon the export of war
materials the United States contended that a neutral state was neither
under an obligation to prevent private individuals from supplying war
materials to belligerents nor under a duty to ensure that the resources coming from neutral territory would not serve to confer a decided advantage
upon one side. It is clear that in taking this position the United States had
the support of the established law. 31 The proper recourse open to dis30 There are, however, some significant exceptions to this distinction between the obligations
mposed upon a neutral state with respect to ,i ts own acts and the absence of obligation with
respect to similar acts when performed by subjects of the neutral state. A neutral state is not
only obliged to abstain itself from performing such acts as may be regarded as serving to turn
its territory into a base of operations for belligerents; it is also obliged to prevent the commission of acts by private individuals within its jurisdiction which may be considered as having
a similar effect (see pp. 2.2.7-31). It is sufficient to observe here, though, that the traditional
law does not regard the export of war materials-warships apart-from neutral territory, when
undertaken by private individuals in the course of ordinary commercial transactions, as serving
to turn such territory into a base of operations for belligerents.
31 The relevant correspondence dealing with the incident in question is given in Hackworth,
op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 617-2.1. There can be little doubt as to the correctness-in strict lawof the American position, a conclusion reached at the time by several writers in an exhaustive
review of the matter in A.]. I. L., 10 (1916). See W. C. Morey, "The Sale of Munitions of
War," pp. 476 ff.; C. N. Gregory, "Neutrality and the Sale of Arms," pp. 543 ff.; and J. W.
Garner, "The Sale and Exportation of Arms and Munitions of War to Belligerents," pp. 749 ff.
At the same time, it was equally clear not only that the scale of the traffic in arms and munitions
to the Allies represented an unprecedented event but that the traffic itself was very likely a
decisive factor in staving off Allied defeat. See, generally, Alice M. Morrissey, The American
Defence of Neutral Rights zgz,rzgz7 (1939). It is of interest to note that the position taken by the
Central Powers did not rest directly upon an advocacy of a "principle of equalization" but
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advantaged belligerents is to undertake repressive measures against the
subjects of a neutral state engaged in furnishing assistance to an enemy,
and the rules relating to contraband, blockade and unneutral service, as
well as the rules governing visit, search and seizure, prescribe lawful means
belligerents may use to accomplish this end. In turn, the neutral state
must acquiesce in the repressive measures a belligerent is permitted by law
to take at sea against the subjects of a neutral state engaged in assisting an
enemy-whether by supplying him with war materials or by furnishing
him with other forms of assistance.
But although a neutral state is under no obligation to do so it may place
restrictions upon, or forbid entirely, both the export from and transit
through its territory of war materials intended for belligerents. The conservation of resources or the more effective preservation of neutral status
may further lead non-participants to extend restrictive measures to private
trade in goods other than war materials, aod to loans or credits as well. 32
Indeed, there is nothing to prevent a neutral state from undertaking to
prevent all kinds of commercial intercourse between its subjects and belligerent states, and provided only that such restrictions are applied in an
impartial manner the legislation enacted by neutral states to this purpose
raises considerations of policy though not of law. 33
upon the fact-noted in the Austro-Hungarian note of June 29, I9I5-"that the economic life
of the United States had been made serviceable to the greatest extent [to the Allies] by the
creation of new and the enlargement of existing concerns for the manufacture and exportation
of war requisites and thus, so to say, been militarized, if it be permitted to use here this muchmisused word . . . in the concentration of so many forces to the one end . . . lies a fait nouveau
which weakens reference to supposed precedents in other wars.''
32 In the past, a number of states when neutral have enacted such restrictions, and practice in
this respect has been reviewed in Harvard Draft Convention On The Rights and Duties of Neutral
States in Naval and Aerial War, op. cit., pp. 28I ff.
33 The neutrality legislation enacted by the Congress of the United States during the years
I935-39 undoubtedly represents the most significant recent example of a neutral state imposing
restrictions upon its citizens respecting commercial intercourse with belligerents that were far
in excess of the requirements laid down by international law. The Neutrality Act of May I,
I937 declared in Section I that: "Whenever the President shall find that there exists a state of
war between, or among, two or more sovereign states, the President shall proclaim such fact,
and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export or attempt to export, or cause to be exported arms,
ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the United States to any belligerent state
named in such proclamation or to any neutral state for transshipment to, or for the u.se of, any
such belligerent state." The I937 Act provided further, in Section 2, that no other materials
listed in a presidential proclamation could be exported to belligerent states save in foreign
vessels and after American citizens had yielded all right, title or interest. Loans and credits to
belligerent governments were forbidden. The I937 Act also forbade United States citizens to
travel on belligerent merchantmen or aircraft and prohibited the arming of American merchantmen. Upon the outbreak of war in September I939, the embargo on arms, ammunition, a~d
implements of war was put into effect by Presidential Proclamation of September 5, I939 (Section 2 of the I937 Act having lapsed May I, I939). On November 4, I939 a new joint resolution
of Congress was approved which repealed earlier legislation, and particularly the arms embargo.
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It is evident that the basic distinction drawn by the traditional law
between the obligations of abstention imposed upon a neutral state with
respect to its own acts and the normal absence of obligation on the part of
the neutral state to prevent its subjects from performing similar acts rests
upon the possibility of maintaining a clear separation between the public
activities of the neutral state and the private activities undertaken by
subjects of the neutral state. Recent wars have made it abundantly clear,
however, that the continued possibility of maintaining this separation in
practice has become very difficult. The extent to which states now exercise
either direct ownership or indirect control over economic activities formerly
regarded as outside their proper sphere of activity may-and does-vary
considerably. Nevertheless, this variation has been significantly narrowed
in time of war. Where a neutral state does not nationalize its foreign
trade, control over exports through a system of licensing and similar
measures no longer allows such trade to be characterized as '' private'' in
any but the most nominal sense of that term.
It is, in fact, hardly possible to reconcile the conditions that generally
prevailed during the two World Wars with the conditions that are plainly
assumed by the traditional law. The trading activities of neutral subjects
were no longer determined by the decisions of private neutral traders, a
fact that is readily apparent where the state has nationalized foreign trade.
Yet it is only slightly less apparent where the neutral state exercises decisive control in determining the kinds and quantities of goods to be
allowed for export, as well as the destination of such exports. During
World War II, the practices initiated in an earlier war were once again
adopted by neutral states, subject only to expansion and further refinement.
Not only did most neutral states enact stringent export (and import) controls, many of them concluded formal trade agreements with belligerents
whose purpose was to set limitations upon the quantity of goods neutrals
According to the Act of November 1939, it was made unlawful for American vessels to carry
either passengers or articles to any belligerent state named in a presidential proclamation.
Among other features, the Act required the complete transfer of ti tie (the so-called ''cash and
carry'' provision) to all goods prior to export. It also authorized the President to declare
combat areas ('war zones') within which American citizens and American vessels could not
enter except under specially prescribed regulations. Other provisions of earlier acts-e. g., the
prohibitions against loans and credits, travel by American citizens on belligerent merchantmen,
and arming of American merchantmen-were re-enacted. On November 17, 1941 sections 2.
(governing commerce with belligerents), 3 (dealing with combat areas) and 6 (forbidding the
arming of American merchantmen) were repealed by joint resolution of Congress.-For texts
of relevant Acts, Presidential Proclamations and Regulations, see U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, I9J9, pp. 101-54, and International Law Documents, I94I, pp. 46-9. For
a review of questions arising over the application of the Act of November 4, 1939, see Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 643-8. A general survey of the neutrality legislation of the
period is given by F. Deak, ''The United States Neutrality Acts,'' International Conciliation, No.
358, March 1940.
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would permit to be exported to states with which the belligerent party
to the agreement was at war. 34
Nor has the transformation in the economic functions undertaken by the
state affected only the status and application of the rules governing neutral
trade in war materials with belligerents. In naval warfare this transformation may also affect the rules governing the supply and repair of
belligerent warships in neutral ports. Subject to certain restrictions 35 the
traditional law permits belligerent warships to obtain supplies and repairs
in neutral ports by recourse to the market. However, this law does not
permit the neutral state, or its agencies, to provide warships with such
supplies and repairs as the warship is otherwise permitted to obtain in
neutral ports and the neutral state is not obligated to prevent. 36 But where
fuel supplies and the facilities of ports are either owned or controlled by
the neutral state a strict interpretation of neutral obligations would appear
to forbid altogether the granting of fuel and repairs to belligerent warships. 37
Indeed, the regulation of so-called "private" neutral trade became almost exclusively a
matter to be determined between the belligerent and the neutral state. Medlicott (op. cit.,
pp. 139) has described in considerable detail the work of the British Ministry of Economic
Warfare in concluding the "war trade agreements" with neutral states. "The basic aim of
these complicated negotiations," Medlicott writes, "was to ensure that the neutrals would
prohibit altogether the re-export to Germany of goods reaching them through the Allied
controls, and would limit the sale to Germany of other goods to 'normal' pre-war figures. In
return the British Government agreed in each case to facilitate the passage through the controls
of goods covered by the agreements, and to refrain from demanding individual guarantees
against re-exports" (p. 55). In the draft war-trade agreements instructions sent out in September 1939, to all British missions in neutral states it was stated that: "Its (i. e., the proposed
war trade agreements) underlying principle is ... that, in return for certain undertakings as
to the limitation and control of . . . trade with the enemy, His Majesty's government will
undertake to permit and so far as possible to facilitate the importation by . . . of commodities
essential for her domestic consumption'' (p. 664).
35 See pp. 2.4o-4.
3 6 Thus the United States Neutrality (General) Proclamation of September 5, 1939 declared:
""No agency of the United States Government shall, directly or indirectly, provide supplies
nor effect repairs to a belligerent ship of war." This provision merely states the neutral's
obligation under the traditional law.
37 In the case of The Attilio Regolo and Other Vessels (Annual Digest of Pttblic International Law
Cases (1947), Case No. 137, pp. 31_9-2.4), an arbitration between the United States, Great Britain
and Italy on the one hand and Spain on the other, the Arbitrator was called upon to decide
whether "the provisions of Article 19 of the Hague Convention (XIII) of 1907 entail an obligation on the neutral State to give active assistance in ensuring supplies of fuel to belligerent
warships anchored in its waters, or, on the other hand, does refueling represent a right of the
said ships, their inability to exercise which in good time does not preclude a strict application
of the twenty-four hours' rule." The Arbitrator held that Article 19 "does not lay on the
neutral State any specific obligation to assist actively in providing supplies of fuel," but that
fueling does represent a "right which the belligerent warship may exercise by recourse to the
market.'' The Arbitrator went on to point out: ''In no sense-grammatical, logical or juridic~l
does the Article (19 of Hague XIII) under examination lay on the neutral State the duty of
actively assisting in making supplies available. Such duty, we may add, is inconsistent with
34
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It may be that revision of the law of neutrality to permit neutral states
themselves to supply fuel to belligerent warships or to grant the latter use
of state-owned port facilities would raise no "insurmountable difficulty,,.
that" it is probable that even without express revision the established law
of neutrality could be applied by way of a reasonable interpretation of its
basic provisions in the light of new conditions.·· 38 It can be contended that
the principal consideration is that belligerent warships ought not to make
use of neutral ports in excess of the restrictions laid down by Hague Convention XIII (1907), and this may be ensured regardless of the fact that the
limited assistance made available to warships in neutral ports is obtained
directly from the neutral state itself rather than by recourse to the market. 39
Even so, the major problem remains, that is of applying to present
conditions the rule forbidding neutral states to supply belligerents in any
manner, directly or indirectly, with war materials. In those states where
foreign trade has been nationalized it seems clear that if the traditional law
retains its validity the supply of war materials of any kind must be considered as a departure from the duties imposed upon a neutral state. 40 Nor
is this conclusion subject to qualification either by the claim that this
situation was not contemplated when the traditional law was established 41
the conceptions of the State, prevailing in 1907, as remote from pursuits of a commercial nature
and as being exclusively a constitutional organism whose specific duty as a neutral, under the
system we are now examining, was merely to exercise control and supervision in order to
prevent belligerent warships received in its waters from using the latter as a base of operations
and thus compromising the neutrality of the State granting them access:•
313 Lauterpacht, "The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War," p. 377·
39 On the other hand, the dissatisfaction long felt in many quarters over the "limited assistance" neutrals may grant belligerent warships under Hague XIII is not likely to be attenuated
by this possible revision of the law in order to permit the neutral state to supply fuel and carry
out repairs. If anything, it would be increased-and not unreasonably so.
4° '' • . . a neutral state which permits its publicly-owned vessels to carry cargo which would
be subject to confiscation if carried in a privately-owned vessel, or whose publicly-owned
vessels are guilty of any form of conduct which would render them liable to condemnation if
they were privately-owned vessels, would itself be guilty of disregarding pro tanto the law of
neutrality . . . . " S. W. D. Rowson, op. cit., p. 178. For further expressions to the same
effect, see Lawrence Preuss, "Some Effects of Governmental Controls On Neutral Duties,"
Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 31 (1937), pp. 108-19, and Harvard Draft
Convention on Rights and Duties of Netttral States in Naval and Aerial War, op. cit., pp. 2.38-44.
Nor is the conclusion stated above denied by those writers who nevertheless contend that
retention of the traditional law serves to penalize states adopting socialist economies, e. g.,
W. Friedmann, "The Growth of State Control Over the Individual, and Its Effect Upon the
Rules of International State Responsibility," B. Y. I. L., 19 (1938), pp. 130 ff.
41 This point has been frequently made by writers and is, in any event, not a matter of dispute.
During World War II the application of the rule forbidding the supply of war materials by
neutral states may be interpreted, in view of the extension of the notion of contraband, as
forbidding almost all trade between the Soviet Union (while still a neutral) and belligerent
states. That the Soviet Union did not adhere in its behavior to this prohibition is a matter
of public record. It may be argued that this example of the Soviet Union during the years
193~41 shm~.rs the futility of attempting to apply the traditional law to a major neutral state
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(and, obviously, it was not) or by the attempt to differentiate between the
' 'political'' as opposed to the ''commercial'' character of the transactions
carried out by the neutral state. 42
No clear conclusion can be drawn, however, with respect to the possible
liability of state-owned neutral vessels and cargoes to the law of prize.
Although it has been contended that the" vessels (other than men-of-war)
and cargoes of such States are subject to the ordinary incidents of the law
of blockade and contraband and of other belligerent rights," 43 practice to
date does not as yet afford sufficient grounds for endorsing this claim. It
is by no means certain that belligerents have even a right to visit and
search the publicly owned vessels of a neutral which are engaged in commercial activities, let alone the right to seize and to condemn such vessels
and their cargo in accordance with the rules relating to contraband and
blockade. 44
that has completely collectivized its economy. Nevertheless, in the absence of wider agreement among states that this aspect of the traditional law should be abandoned, it can only
be assumed that the rule forbidding neutral states to supply belligerents with war materials
remains valid.
42 It has been suggested that if' 'the nature of the deal, whether political or commercial, and
not the fact of governmental ownership or control, is to be the test for determining legal responsibility, and if it is political favoritism and political assistance rather than governmental
supervision as such which gives taint to the transaction, then what is to be looked for in this
quest for a criterion as to private capacity is the amount or extent of political bias or influence
manifest in any given arrangements between a belligerent government and a corporation or
agency owned or controlled by a neutral state.'' ''Neutral Duties and State Control of Enterprise,''
U. S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, I9J9, p. 10. It may be doubted
whether this suggested differentiation between the "political" and the "economic" acts of
the neutral state is at all feasible, dependent as it must be upon a "search into the motives
and into the details of each particular act" (p. u). In any event, it has no basis in the traditional law, which is not concerned with whether the act of supplying a belligerent state with
assistance for the prosecution of war has an "economic" or "political" motivation. Finally,
it may be observed that little support for this suggestion can be found by the appeal to the principle of impartiality, since the latter too is concerned with the acts of a neutral state, not with
its motives.
43 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 657.
44 The actual practice of states during World War II is scarcely conclusive even as to the right
of visit and search. A number of writers have made much over the alleged insistence on the
part of Great Britain during the early stages of World War II to subject Soviet state-owned
vessels engaged in commercial activities to the same measures of control which privately owned
neutral vessels are liable. It is true that on several occasions British warships exercised visit
and search over Soviet vessels. The British Government, however, made no clear reply to the
protests of the Soviet Government that state-owned merchant ships were exempt from the
operation of belligerent rights. The matter was never put to a test since the Soviet Government thereafter avoided areas in which their vessels would possibly -be subject to the British
contraband control system. The incidents are recounted in some detail by Medlicott, op. cit:,
pp. p8-2.o.-There are, on the other hand, certain indications in prize rules and manuals of ~
tendency to assimilate neutral state-owned vessels engaged in commercial activities to the
position of privately owned neutral vessels. See section 5oob Law of Naval Warfare. Note
should also be taken of the German Prize Law Code of 1939, which provided in Article I:
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Undue concentration upon the criterion of state-ownership, h owever,
ought not to lead to a neglect of the far more difficult considerations involved in applying the traditional law to neutral trade which, though not
state-owned, is state-controlled. A strict application of this law would
appear equally to forbid neutral trade in war materials when such trade is
controlled and directed by the neutral state. 45 And in view of the near
universal practices of neutral states in recent wars there must remain, on
this consideration, only a negligible amount of neutral trade w hose character does not involve the responsibility of the neutral state. 46
In an admirable analysis of the numerous problems imposed by the breakdown in practice of the neutral state-neutral trader distinction Julius Stone
has proposed the following "two main lines of legal reform" available to
states:
One would assimilate the legal position of the trading State to
the private trader, permitting the State to trade subject to belligerent controls of contraband, blockade and the like. The other
would assimilate the private trader's legal position to that of the
State, forbidding him and forbidding his State to permit him to
engage in the affected trade. Neither line has any a priori validity.
Which should be adopted is a matter of legislative policy . . . .
Between the two alternatives offering, therefore, the Writer
' 'Prize Law covers the authority to visit and search enemy and neutral ships as well as to deal
with these ships and goods carried on them according to the following provisions. Warships
and other public vessels which are designed or used exclusively for purposes of public administration and not for trade purposes are not subject to prize law." To date, however, these and
similar manifestations have yet to stand the test of practical application. And it is difficult
to avoid the conclusion of Rowson (op. cit., p. 177), who declares that with respect to the
liability of neutral state-owned merchant vessels the law is still "in its infancy."
45 And without regard to whether such control is exercised through export controls and
licensing measures or by the state's creation of trading organizations endowed with a "private
character." The latter measure may furnish a means for permitting belligerents to exercise
those controls that have long been exercised over private neutral traders, but it cannot do away
with the fact that decisive control would still be exercised by the neutral state.
46 The decisive point, therefore, is no longer that undue concentration upon the criterion of
state ownership leads to conclusions that discriminate against states resorting to nationalization. Instead, it is that concentration upon the sole factor of state ownership neglects the
more important-since far more widespread-practices of state control which fall short of
ownership, and that these practices of state control constitute the most significant factor in subverting the clear intent of the traditional law. This is the burden of the
excellent remarks of Julius Stone (op. cit., pp. 41o-1) in criticism of the position that "it is
impossible to maintain one set of rules for countries organized on the basis of private enterprise
and another for countries where the production of and trade in certain articles is in the hands
of the State." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 657-8. Professor Stone's reply is that in
view of the extensive controls over trade now exercised by nearly all neutral states the insistence
upon looking only at the criterion of state ownership has precisely this result-to lead to two
sets of rules.
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accepts the former, namely, that trading activity of neutral Governments with belligerents should be assimilated to private trading
in both respects. First, that the duty of the neutral Government
not to supply arms, munitions, or to grant loans should be abolished. Second, that the ships, and cargoes, and other instrumentalities of the neutral Government employed in such trade
should be subject to the ordinary penalties for contraband carriage,
blockade breach, and the like, and should not en joy (while
involved in such trade) the immunities ordinarily enjoyed by
State owned ships and property. 47
These suggestions for legal reform represent a clear attempt to close the
ever widening gap that exists between the behavior prescribed by the
traditional rules and the actual practices of neutral states in the two World
Wars. Even further, they recognize that it is unrealistic to consider the
conditions that have brought about the present decline of the neutral
state-neutral trader distinction as merely transient phenomena. Nevertheless, the proposal that the position of the neutral state should now be
assimilated, in matters of trade, to the position traditionally held by the
private neutral trader is one involving substantial difficulty. 48
It is of course true that neutral trade has always been a significant factor
in warfare at sea, and belligerents have always sought to go as far as possible
in cutting off this trade with the enemy. But it is hardly necessary to
observe that the ever present belligerent desire to cut off neutral trade with
an enemy is-for reasons already noted-far greater today than in an earlier
period. In view of the increased importance of the economic arm in the
conduct of modern war the proposal that the neutral state be assimilated
in matters of trade to the position of the private neutral trader might well
have the effect of conferring upon neutrals the legal possibility of exercising
a decisive influence upon the outcome of a conflict.
Nor should it be overlooked that private neutral trade, being motivated
by considerations of gain and not by political considerations, was generally
Stone, op. cit., pp. 412.-3.
It should be made clear that the above discussion is independent of, and does not prejudice,
any duties and rights of nonparticipants resulting from the changed legal posidon of war (see
pp. 165 ff). With respect to the Charter of the United Nations it will be readily apparent that
the effective operation of the collective security system established by that instrument would
render any further consideration of the present problem of little more than nominal value.
And even if the Security Council cannot effectively exercise the functions conferred upon it by
the Charter, it may nevertheless be contended that member states have a right to assist a state
made the victim of an armed attack and a duty to refrain from ass~sting the attacker. From
this point of view the proposal to abandon the neutral state's duties of abstention would not
be in accord with the obligation to refrain from assisting an aggressor. On the other hand,
the alternative proposal of placing an embargo upon all neutral trade (public and private) wit.h
belligerents would not be in accord with the presumed right of third states to assist the victim
of an unlawful resort to war.
47

48
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without organization and direction . In this sense it was politically
indifferent, and this political indifference was not substantially affected by
reason of the fact that the neutral state might take up and press the cause
of the private trader against belligerents. All this must change once the
state is openly allowed to take over the position occupied by the private
trader. Presumably, the neutral state would be under no obligation to
act impartially in supplying belligerents with war materials, and, in any
event, it is difficult to see how the principle of impartiality could be applied
effectively in this instance. The neutral state would be able to organize
and direct its assistance in a manner that would have been impossible for
private traders. It does not appear realistic to expect that the neutral state
would determine its trading policy in a non-political vacuum. On the
contrary, the expectation must be that political considerations will prevail
over considerations of economic gain.
In a word, the proposal that the neutral state's position be assimilated
to that of the private neutral trader would, if accepted, result in the neutral
state's interference in the conduct of a war just short of active participation
in hostilities. Given the transcendent importance of the economic factor
it would normally prove to be only a very short step to such active participation. 49 If past experience is to prove of any value it would appear to
indicate that if neutrality is to be preserved at all it will be done only
under the condition that it does not serve to confer a substantial-let alone
a decisive-advantage upon either belligerent. This consideration may
imply the desirability of forbidding all neutral trade in war materials with
belligerents. The neutral state-neutral trader distinction has always been
something of an anomaly, understandable in the context of the particular
historic conditions in which it arose. These conditions obtain today
only to a very limited extent. With their disappearance the retention of
the rules which developed out of them lose further justification. Yet in
altering these rules the traditional system of neutrality would seem best
preserved-assuming such preservation to be the central purpose of legal
reform-not by suggesting that an otherwise anomalous practice now be
transformed into an even more general situation, but rather by forbidding
all neutral trade with belligerents. The economic hardships complete
abstention might impose upon the economy of a neutral state could un49 Of course, given a preponderance of belligerent power such trade would only rarely be
tolerated. The proposal would work, if at all, only in a local war. Yet even here its results
would probably prove undesirable, if it is assumed that the objective would be to keep the war
from spreading. For the proposal under discussion would most likely have the contrary effect.
Instead of isolating a conflict it would constitute an open invitation for other states to fish in
troubled waters, thus running the risk of expanding the conflict. No doubt states have done
just this, even under the rules laid down by the traditional law, and will continue to do so.
But there seems little point in providing them with the legal justification for doing so.
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doubtedly be considerable. They are certainly no greater, however, than
the hardships imposed by participation in modern war. 50
All this is mere speculation, though. From the point of view of the
present law the tradi tiona! rules based upon the distinction drawn between
neutral state and neutral trader remain valid, though marked by ever increasing difficulty in their application and-in all probability-a corresponding decline in their effectiveness.
E. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF NEUTRAL PORTS AND
TERRITORIAL WATERS; 51 NEUTRAL DUTIES OF PREVENTION
A neutral state is obliged not only to abstain itself from the performance
of certain acts; it is further obliged to prevent the commission of certain
Admittedly, the proposal to place upon non-participants the duty to prevent all commercial intercourse with belligerents is also beset with difficulty. On balance, however, these
difficulties would appear less formidable than the difficulties attendant upon the suggested
assimilation of the neutral state to the position heretofore held by the neutral trader. The
argument that the complete severance of trade would extend considerably the neutral's preventive duties is quite true, though not a compelling objection. Indeed, given the pervasive
controls already exercised by states-when neutral-over exports, the extension involved
would affect the scope of the neutral's duty of abstention far more than creating new duties
of prevention. Undoubtedly, the more serious objection is the economic hardship complete
abstention might impose upon a neutral state's economy. Yet it hardly seems hazardous to
surmise that economic considerations generally have been far less influential in shaping neutral
policies than have been considerations of a distinctly political character, and this despite
Professor Stone's (op. cit., p. 413) somewhat extravagant assertion that it is "fantastic" to
assume that non-participants would ''commit economic self-immolation for the sake of the
law of neutrality." On the contrary, it is submitted that recent experience points far more
clearly to the lesson that states are willing to suffer economic hardships to preserve neutrality,
if the preservation of neutral status is considered to be politically desirable. For precisely the same
reasons-i. e., political-neutral states have intervened in recent hostilities by directing economic aid to the side with whose interests they have become identified.
It may be relevant to add that the foregoing remarks are not designed to suggest either the
widsom or the folly-from a political standpoint-of self-imposed neutral policies of preventing all trade with belligerents. But it does seem clear that in the period accompanying
and directly following the collapse of American neutrality during World War II many observers
drew conclusions whose generality was hardly warranted by the special experience on which
they were based. It is one thing to assert that in a major conflict the attempt on the part of a
third state to isolate itself, when its vital interests are directly involved in the conflict, must
be foredoomed to failure. It is quite another thing to insist that failure must attend any attempts
to isolate the combatants in a limited war where the interests of third states may not be
directly involved-or, at least, where the interests of third states in the outcome of a conflict
is less than their desire to prevent the conflict from spreading. And it will be appar~nt that
it is precisely in a limited war, where the possibilities for the preservation of neutral status
will normally be most favorable, that the economic hardships suffered by the prohibition against
trade with the combatants will be the least severe. All this may be viewed as pointing to the
conclusion-by now, almost a truism-that neutrality will prove feasible only where war i.s
limited in the number, and power, of the participants. Yet the decisive point is that it may
prove feasible in just such situations, and hence suggestions for legal reform of the tradition~!
system must concentrate-to be realistic-upon this possible contingency.
51 See, generally, Law of Naval Warfare, section 440 and notes thereto,
50
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acts by anyone within its jurisdiction . Those acts a neutral state is obligated to prevent may be performed either by belligerents or by private
individuals. In naval warfare attention is directed to the acts a neutral
must forbid in its ports and territorial waters. The most authoritative
source for an inquiry into the rules restricting the use of neutral ports and
territorial waters remains Hague Convention XIII (1907). 52
In defining the scope of a neutral's duties with respect to its waters and
ports Hague Convention XIII does not purport to indicate the acts a
neutral state may forbid but the acts it must forbid. There is nothing to
prevent a neutral from placing restrictions upon the use of its waters and
ports which are in excess of the requirements laid down by international
law, and in practice many states when neutral do exercise their right to
impose restrictions beyond those required by law. In so doing the neutral
state is only under the obligation to see that its regulations are applied
impartially toward all belligerents. 53
I.

Belligerent Acts of Hostility ln Neutral Waters

Article 2. of Hague Convention XIII declares that: "Any act of hostility,
including capture and the exercise of the right of search, committed by
belligerent war-ships in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, constitutes a violation of neutrality and is strictly forbidden.'' In principle, the
rule enjoining belligerent respect for the inviolability of neutral waters
appears quite plain. In practice, however, certain questions have arisen
that concern the precise scope of the belligerent's duty of abstention.
It is clear, to begin with, that this belligerent duty toward the neutral
state is not without limitation. A belligerent is not obligated to refrain
under all circumstances from taking hostile measures against the naval forces
of an enemy located in neutral waters. In the event that the forces of one
belligerent violate neutral waters (or ports) and the neutral state willfully
permits such violation it cannot complain if the other belligerent-as an
extreme measure-attacks his enemy while still in the waters of the neutral
state. The neutra} state has not only the right to prevent the misuse of its
waters and ports but also a duty to take adequate measures of prevention.
This neutral duty is owed to the belligerent that has otherwise respected
the rights of the neutral state and that will be placed at a disadvantage in
52

Though never ratified by Great Britain (nor, for that matter, by Russia) and not technically
binding in either World War, the provisions of Hague Convention XIII (1907), have nevertheless been considered-on the whole-as declaratory of the customary rules restricting belligerent use of neutral ports and waters. However, there are certain provisions of the Convention
that have not received the acceptance of numerous naval powers, and these provisions will
be noted in the following pages. It should also be observed that Hague XIII does not deal with
the rules concerning belligerent rights with respect to neutral commerce at sea. Even in relation
to neutral waters and ports the Convention is not to be considered as exhaustive, which is
one reason for Article I obligating belligerents ''to respect the sovereign rights of neutral
Powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters, from any act which would, if
knowingly permitted, constitute a violation of neutrality."
53 Hague XIII, Article 9·
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war by the unlawful use made of neutral waters and ports by an enemy. In
allowing the forces of one belligerent to misuse its waters and ports the
neutral state thereby violates its duty toward the other belligerent, and
the acts of hostility that the offended belligerent may take against the
forces of his enemy in neutral waters may be interpreted as permitted
measures of reprisal against the delinquent neutral. 54
The scope of the belligerent's obligation to abstain from committing
hostile acts in neutral waters must therefore depend, in large measure,
upon the nature and scope of the neutral's obligation to prevent the unlawful use by belligerents of its waters and ports. In naval warfare the generally accepted standard the neutral is obliged to meet in fulfilling its
duties-and certainly the standard imposed by Hague XIII-is that it use
the "means at its disposal." 55 But the fact that a neutral fulfills its duty
so long as it exercises such surveillance as the means at its disposal allow
to prevent violations of its waters and ports need not mean, however, that
the belligerent's obligation of abstention is unqualified by the effectiveness
of the preventive measures taken by the neutral.
It is evident that in the event the neutral state cannot effectively enforce
its rights against an offending belligerent the ensuing situation may lead
to one of considerable difficulty. Belligerent warships may be threatened
with attack by an enemy while in neutral waters, and the shore state may
be unable to exercise adequate measures of prevention. The forces of a
belligerent may persistently violate the waters of a neutral state to the
grave disadvantage of an enemy that has heretofore respected neutral
waters. In these, and other, circumstances the neutral state, while using
the means at its disposal, may be wholly unable to enforce its rights effectively. Must the belligerent whose interests suffer as a result of an enemy's
violation of neutral waters nevertheless abstain from taking hostile
measures in neutral waters against his adversary?
54 These are measures of reprisal against the neutral, not against the belligerent. In misusing
neutral waters the belligerent has violated no right of its enemy.
55 Article 2.5 of Hague XIII declares: "A neutral Power is bound to exercise such surveillance
as the means at its disposal allow to prevent any violation of the provisions of the above Articles
in its ports or roadsteads, or in its waters.-Article 2.6 of the r92.8 Habana Convention on
Maritime Neutrality provides a substantially similar formulation in stating: "Neutral States
are bound to exert all the vigilance within their power in order to prevent in their ports or
territorial waters any violation of the foregoing provisions. "-In the Harvard Draft Convention
On the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War (op. cit., p. 2.45) the same concept of the scope of the neutral's duty is expressed. Article 6 of the Draft Convention states:
"A neutral state shall use the means at its disposal to prevent within its territory the commission of any act the toleration of which would constitute a no~-fulfillment of its neutral
duty; the use of force for this purpose shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act."
The comment to Article 6 declares that the article expresses ''the general standard by which
a neutral State's fulfillment of its neutral duties is to be measured. A neutral state is not
insurer of the fulfillment of its neutral duties. It is obligated merely to use the 'means at its
disposal' to secure the fulfillment of its duties" (p. 2.47).
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It can hardly be said that the dilemma posed by the situation of the weak
neutral has been clearly and satisfactorily resolved even today. 56 The
relatively few incidents that appear to have a bearing upon this problem
are not entirely free from ambiguity, and their significance as possible
precedents ought not to be overestimated. 57 Despite this dearth of precedents it is the opinion of a number of publicists that if the neutral state is
56 Equally difficult considerations arise as a result of a neutral's inability to prevent a belligerent from shutting off the neutral state's legitimate intercourse-particularly trade-with an
.
enemy (see pp. 2.52.-8).
57 One such incident occurred during the Russo-Japanese War when a Russian destroyer, the
Peshitelni, which had taken refuge in a Chinese port, was seized and towed off by Japanese
warships. Japan, in justifying the action, maintained that the Chinese authorities had not
taken the necessary measures toward disarming the vessel and ensuring that it would take no
further part in the war. The incident is not entirely clear though, since at the time of the
Japanese action the Peshitelni had ostensibly been interned (two days earlier), and there were
Chinese naval vessels in the port (Chifu) that could have ensured effective internment. In
part, it seems that the Japanese action was taken as a result of previous incidents in which
Chinese waters had been violated by Russian naval forces and China either would not or could
not resist these transgressions.
The most frequently cited incident arising out of World \Var I is the case of the Dresdm.
The incident is summarized in the following passage:
"On March 9, 1915 the German cruiser Dresdm arrived in Cumberland Bay in the Chilean
Juan Fernandez Islands, cast anchor, and asked permission to remain eight days to repair her
engines. The maritime governor of the port refused to grant the request, considering it unfounded, and ordered the vessel to leave within 2.4 hours or be subject to internment. At the
end of the period he notified the captain of the vessel that the penalty of internment had been
incurred. On March 14 a British naval squadron arrived and opened fire on the Dresdm while
she lay at anchor some 500 meters from shore. The Dresden raised a flag of truce and sent an
officer to inform the British squadron that she was in neutral waters. The British squadron
ordered the Dresden to surrender or be destroyed; the captain of the Dresden thereupon blew up
his own ship, and the crew made their way ashore." Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 370.
The Chilean government protested the action of the British squadron, maintaining that the
internment of the Dresden was as effective as the circumstances would permit, and contended
that, in any event, the British naval squadron could have prevented, by close watch, the possibility of the Dresden escaping to sea and once again attacking British commerce. In its reply
the British Government stated that it was prepared to offer a "full and ample apology" to the
Chilean Government for the action. It added, however, that if the Chilean authorities could
not prevent the Dresdm from abusing Chilean waters and properly intern her, these circumstances would "explain the action taken by the British ship." It is difficult to determine,
therefore, whether the offer of an apology by Great Britain was intended as an unqualified
apology for the action of the British squadron or whether it was offered because the British
Government was not certain that under the circumstances the Chilean authorities might have
been able to take the measures necessary to intern the Dresden.
The incident of the Altmark (see pp. 2.36-9) during World ·war II, though also frequently
cited by writers, is of doubtful relevance. In the Altmark incident there appeared little doubt
that Norway had the "means at its disposal" to enforce its neutrality. Nor did the British
Government attempt to justify the measures of hostility it finally resorted to within Norwegian
waters on the grounds that Norway was unable to enforce her rights. On the contrary, the
British contention was that Norway had the means but was unwilling to use these means.
The British action, if justifiable, must be interpreted then as a reprisal against Norway for the
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unable to enforce its rights against one belligerent making unlawful use of
its waters the other belligerent may-as an extreme measure-resort to
hostile action against the forces of its enemy, though in neutral waters. 58
If this opinion is correct, as it is believed to be, then a belligerent's duty to
abstain from committing acts of hostility in neutral waters must be limited
not only by the willingness but also by the ability of the neutral to enforce
its rights effectively. 59 At the same time, there is general agreement that
where a neutral state is employing the means at its disposal (though ineffectively) to prevent belligerent violations of its waters, a belligerent ought
not to take hostile measures against an enemy making unlawful use of
these waters except when so required for reasons of self-preservation orlatter's failure to observe her duties toward Great Britain. Interestingly enough, however,
most of the writers approving the British action in the Altmark incident refer to the measure
as one of "self help" rather than of reprisal.
More relevant in this connection is the British and French resort to the mining of Norwegian
territorial waters in April 1940, on the eve of the German invasion of Norway. On this occasion the British and French Governments, alleging the persistent abuse by Germany of Norwegian territorial waters, declared that: "Whatever may be the actual policy which the Norwegian Government, by German threats and pressures, are compelled to follow, the Allied
Governments can no longer afford to acquiesce in the present state of affairs by which Germany
obtains resources vital to her prosecution of the war, and obtains from Norway facilities which
place the Allies at a dangerous disadvantage . . . " cited in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII,
p. 148. The implication was clear that the mining of Norwegian waters was a measure of
"self help" justified in view of Norway's inability to prevent German misuse of her waters.
58 Thus Hyde (op. cit., pp. 2.337-8) has stated that the "obligation resting upon the belligerent
with respect to the neutral is not of unlimited scope. Circumstances may arise when the belligerent is excused from disregarding the prohibition. If a neutral possesses neither the power
nor disposition to check warlike activities within its own domain, the belligerent that in consequence is injured or threatened with immediate injury would appear to be free from the
normal obligation to refrain from the commission of hostile acts therein. In naval warfare
such a situation may arise through the presence of vessels of war of opposing belligerents simultaneously in the same neutral port or roadstead." Also Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit.,
p. 695n. Smith (op. cit., p. 148) states that in naval, as in land, warfare the neutral "must be
both willing and able to assert his exclusive sovereign rights over the area concerned." But see
Kunz (Kriegsrecht und Neutralitt1tsrecht, p. 2.40), who asserts that the belligerent right of ''self
help" against the forces of an enemy violating neutral rights does not extend to the exercise of
hostile acts within neutral waters.-lt is interesting to note that in land warfare the standards
applied to neutral and belligerent conduct have not been quite the same as in naval warfare.
Although the territory of neutral powers is, according to Article I of Hague Convention V
(1907), inviolable, the scope of the neutral's duty is not limited merely to using the "means at
its disposal." And paragraph 52.0 of the U. S. Army Rules of Land Warfare states the rule
applicable to land warfare in declaring that: "Should the neutral state be unable, or fail for
any reason, to prevent violations of its neutrality by the troops of one belligerent entering or
passing through its territory, the other belligerent may be justified in at~acking the enemy forces
on this territory." With respect to aerial warfare, Spaight (op. cit., p. 434) asserts the legality·
of belligerent attack upon the aerial forces of an enemy making unlawful use of neutral jurisdiction. However, the precedents he is able to cite from World War II practice in support o{
this opinion are rather slight.
·
59 See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 441.
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though this is still a matter of some dispute-in order to prevent an enemy
from gaining a material advantage in the conduct of war. 60
It may appear incongruous to maintain, on the one hand, that the
neutral state is bound only to use the means at its disposal to prevent
belligerent transgressions of its ports and waters, while asserting, on the
other hand, that should the means available to a neutral prove ineffective
a belligerent is not forbidden under the circumstances referred to above
from attacking an enemy that is misusing these waters. In part, however,
this apparent incongruity stems from the characterization of the measures
a belligerent is not forbidden to exercising in neutral waters as measures of
reprisal. This characterization is mistaken, since the neutral, in using the
means at its disposal, has fulfilled its duty. But although the neutral state
has not violated its duty it is equally true that the belligerent, in taking
hostile measures, has not violated the rights of the neutral. The seeming
incongruity involved in this situation is resolved then simply by interpreting the scope of the belligerent's duty to abstain from committing hostile
60 It is still the opinion of perhaps the majority of writers that the only exception ought to
be self preservation-interpreted in the most narrow sense. If this is true then belligerent
forces may resort to hostile measures in neutral waters only when in imminent peril from the
forces of an enemy, and the appeal to local protection is either precluded by the known weakness
of the neutral or is simply not feasible in view of the imminence of the peril. Thus, Stone (op.
cit., p. 4or) observes that "where appeal for local protection is feasible, the aggrieved State's
vessel would seem not to be entitled to defend or help itself in neutral territory or waters. If
appeal to local protection was impossible or pointless, the attacked vessel's right of self-defense
is more arguable; it does not seem likely that it could extend beyond what its own self-preservation or escape from peril required. "-It is, of course, clear that where local protection is available-i. e., where the neutral is able to enforce its rights-measures of self help are not permissible. But then there is no problem. In pracdce, though, there is always the difficulty that
the neutral state will later contend that it would have taken the necessary preventive measures
and that the belligerent's action was hasty and unjustified. There is no easy answer to this
difficulty, and each case must be judged by the attendant circumstances. But this does not
alter the essential principle, which is that if such "local protection" is not available a belligerent may resort to hostile measures of self help in neutral waters. More important is the claim
that hostile measures must be limited to cases of self-preservation-interpreted narrowly. Yet
it should be apparent that belligerent misuse of neutral waters may thereby confer important
advantages upon the lawbreaker, even though considerations of self-preservation-in the
most immediate and narrow interpretation of that term-are not involved. To limit the belligerent whose interests suffer as a result of these unlawful activities merely to urging the weak
neutral to use more effective measures of prevention, when it is evident such measures are not
available to the neutral, would appear neither a reasonable nor a very realistic solution. No
doubt the real danger attendant upon the position taken here is that the belligerent may use any
alleged violation of neutral waters by an enemy-no matter how minor-and against which
the neutral has not taken effective preventive measures, as an excuse for resorting to hostile
acts within these same waters. Undoubtedly this danger exists, despite any attempt to restrict
belligerents by laying down what can only be-at best-rather broad criteria. The only real
alternative, however, is to prohibit all hostile belligerent measures in neutral jurisdiction
despite neutral ineffectiveness in preventing the unlawful acts of an enemy. And it should be
pointed out that even to restrict belligerents to the taking of hostile measures only for reasons
of "immediate self-preservation" leaves the door more than slightly ajar to the above danger.
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acts against enemy forces within neutral waters as limited, in principle,
by the effectiveness with which the neutral state can enforce its rights.
One further problem warrants brief consideration here, and it concerns
the geographical area within which the belligerent duty to abstain from
hostile measures is applicable. In the preceding discussion the assumption
has been that the belligerent's obligation extends only to the territorial
waters of a neutral. Article 2. of Hague XIII expressly refers to the'' territorial waters of a neutral Power" as the area within which hostile belligerent measures are forbidden, and the weight of customary practice also
supports the same restriction of the area within which the belligerent
duty applies. 61
Nevertheless, neutral states have frequently expressed dissatisfaction in
the past over the conduct of belligerent operations in waters contiguous to
their territorial seas, either for the reason that such operations unduly
interfered with legitimate neutral trade or because belligerent operations
were alleged to constitute a danger to the security of the shore state. 62
During the first World War this neutral concern found occasional expression, 63 though there were no instances in which neutral states attempted, as a matter of legal right, to restrict belligerent operations in waters
61 It will be apparent, therefore, that the area within which belligerents may conduct their
naval operations may vary, depending upon the extent of the territorial waters claimed by
neutral states and recognized by the belligerents. In the past, neutrals occasionally have sought
to extend the limits of their territorial waters for the special purposes of neutrality. Although
such extensions generally have been of modest nature belligerents have been very slow to accord
them recognition.
62 For a review of neutral practice in this respect, and belligerent responses, see U. S. Naval
War College, International Law Situations, 1928, pp. I-37· Also Harvard Draft Convention on
Rights and DutieJ· of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, op. cit., pp. 343-53. Articles I8 and
I9 of the Draft Convention state:
"Article I8. A belligerent shall not engage in hostile operations on, under or over the
high seas so near to the territory of a neutral state as to endanger life or property therein.
Article I9. A belligerent shall not permit its warships or military aircraft to hover off
the coasts of a neutral State in such manner as to harass the commerce or industry of that
State."
In the commentary to these articles it is declared that, although sound in principle, there is
little express authority for them.
63 The best known instance occurred in I9I5-I6 and was occasioned over the United States'
protest to Great Britain that the latter's practice of belligerent cruisers "patrolling American
coasts in close proximity to the territorial waters of the United States and making the neighborhood a station for their observations is . . . vexatious and discourteous to the. United
States." The British Government replied that it was "unaware of the existence of any rules
or principles of international law which render belligerent operations which are legitimate
in one part of the high seas, illegitimate in another." In answering the British statement it
was noted that: "The grounds for the objection of belligerent vessels of war cruising in close
proximity to American ports are based, not upon the illegality of such action, but upon the
irritation which it naturally causes to a neutral country." Harvard Draft Convention on the
Rights and Dutid of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, op. cit., pp. 35o-2.. As a result of
the exchange the British Government did accede, in part, to the expressed wishes of the
United States, though as a matter of comity not of legal right.
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contiguous to neutral territorial seas. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities
in 1939 such an attempt was made, however. On October 3, 1939, the
Governments of the American Republics meeting at Panama adopted a
declaration whose principal provision read:
As a measure of continental self-protection, the American
Republics, so long as they maintain their neutra1ity, are as of
inherent right entitled to have those waters adjacent to the
American continent, which they regard as of primary concern
and direct utility in their relations, free from the commission of
any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation, whether
such hostile act be attempted or made from land, sea or air. 64
The Declaration of Panama was without precedent in the recent history
of neutral-belligerent relations. The "zone of security" established by
the Declaration extended, in many places, as far as three hundred miles to
sea. The Declaration was never accorded recognition by the belligerents
whose behavior lt was intended to regulate. Indeed, the various responses
of the major belligerents to the Declaration were uniform in contending
that it had no strict foundation in law, that it sought to infringe upon the
established rights of belligerents, and that it therefore required-to achieve
any legal standing-the acquiescence of the interested belligerents. 65 Such
acquiescence was not forthcoming.
Although largely without results in regulating belligerent behavior the
Declaration of Panama did serve to focus attention upon the possibility
that the belligerent's duty to refrain from committing acts of hostility in
neutral territorial waters might be extended, in time, to include a limited
zone adjacent to the territorial seas. In principle, such an extension does
not appear unreasonable. The security needs of states are no less during a
period of war in which they are not active participants than they are in
time of peace-if anything, they are considerably greater in time of war.
The principle of a state's right to exercise a limited jurisdicton in waters
contiguous to territorial seas is now recognized in time of peace. It may
64 The text of the Declaration of Panama, as well as relevant diplomatic correspondence,
together with an analysis of the legal standing of the Declaration may be found in U.S. Naval
War College, International Law Situations, I939, pp. 6r-8o. Strictly speaking, the Declaration
did not insist upon the legal rights of the neutral states, referring rather to "inherent right,"'
"self protection," "fundamental interests of the American States."
65 The belligerents' reaction to the Declaration was made clear in their replies to the protest
made by the American Republics on December 2.3, I939· The immediate occasion for the protest was the action between the German vessel Graf Spee and British naval vessels off the coast
of Uruguay on December 13, I939· The Naval War College concluded, in its analysis of the
legal status of the Declaration, that it did not form "a part of international law. Neutral
jurisdiction for defense purposes over a part of the ocean extending 300 miles from the coast
is without precedent and has not been generally accepted. There is agreement upon the principle but not upon its application to such a tremendously wide belt. Great Britain, France, and
Germany were acting within their legal rights when they refused to recognize the binding
nature of the Panama Declaration" (p. So).
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be expected to obtain similar recognition during a period of hostilities. 66
H so, this will require the neutral state to take on an added burden, for it
can hardly be expected that belligerents will be willing to extend the area
in which they must refrain from hostile operations if neutral states are
unable to exercise an effective control over these waters.
2..

Neutral Ports and Waters As a Base of Operations

Although the principle that a neutral state ought to prevent the belligerent use of its territory, waters and ports as a "base of operations"
received universal acceptance during the course of the nineteenth century,
the interpretation and application of this principle has nevertheless been
marked by a substantial measure of controversy and uncertainty. 67 Not
infrequently attempts have been made to draw specific consequences from
the rule forbidding the use of neutral jurisdiction as a base of operations
that have found recognition neither in the customary practices of states
nor in the rules embodied in international conventions. This has been
particularly true of numerous endeavors to determine the precise scope of
the neutral's dudes of prevention, and the belligerent's duties of abstention,
in naval warfare.
It may well be that in the "light of logic" a neutral state ought to
prevent the commission of any act within its domain-whether performed
by belligerent forces or by private individuals-that may constitute a
"direct source of augmentation of belligerent military or naval strength." 68
In fact, however, the interpretations states have given in naval warfare to
the phrase "base of operations" have not been governed by the canons of
logic but by the various and conflicting policies of states, by the peculiarities of historical development, and by the circumstances attending
naval-as distinguished from land and now aerial-warfare.
Nor can it be asserted that Hague Convention XIII has succeeded in
resolving the many difficulties involved in applying to naval warfare the
general principle under consideration. Although Article 5 of this Convention obligates belligerents to refrain from using ''neutral ports and
waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries," it is only
the erection of'' wireless telegraphy stations or any apparatus for the pur66

See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 4r3d, and notes thereto.
In U. S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, I9J2 (pp. r-2.6), a useful historical
review is made of the varying interpretations given to the term "base of operations" in naval
warfare, and particularly the differences between the traditional American view, empha~izing
the amount of supplies and repairs allowed in neutral ports, and the traditional British view,
stressing the frequency and duration of belligerent stays.
68 The phrases are Hyde's (op. cit., p. 2.2.49), who writes "that the -term 'base of operations_'
fails to indicate with precision the character or scope of the preventive obligation which is
generally acknowledged to rest upon the neutral; for as yet there seems to be no commo_n
disposition to impose upon such a State an endeavor to prevent its domain from b~coming in
numerous situations what, in the light of logic, must cause or permit it to be in fact a direct
source of augmentation of belligerent military or naval strength."
67
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pose of communicating with the belligerent forces on land or sea " that is
specifically defined as falling within this general prohibition. There are,
of course, a large number of further provisions of Hague XIII that may be
regarded properly as applications of the general prohibition contained in
Article 5. But the Convention is not exhaustive in enumerating the acts
a neutral state is obligated to prevent (and a belligerent is obligated to
abstain from committing), and the commission of which would serve to
turn the neutral's waters and ports into a base of naval operations. For
this reason alone, it has not wholly succeeded in removing a measure of the
uncertainty still encountered in any endeavor to elaborate upon the consequences following from the prohibition against the use of neutral jurisdiction as a base of operations for belligerent forces. 69
The duty imposed upon a neutral state not to permh its territory, ports
and waters to be used as a base of operations requires the neutral to prevent
the commission of certain acts, whether performed by belligerent forces
located temporarily within neutral jurisdiction or by private individuals.
The scope of the neutral's duties of prevention with respect to acts of
belligerent forces within its jurisdiction will be considered in later pages.
Here it is desirable to examine the restraints a neutral state must impose
upon the acts of private individuals.
It has been pointed out 70 that although a neutral state must abstain
both from the supply of war materials to belligerents as well as from the
performance of certain services that would serve to aid belligerents in the
prosecution of war it is normally under no obligation to prevent its subjects
from undertaking similar acts of assistance to belligerents. The neutral
state is therefore under no duty to prevent its subjects from trading in war
materials with belligerents; and in carrying on such trade it is immaterial
whether war materials are exported to belligerent ports in neutral bottoms
or are carried away from neutral ports by belligerent merchant vessels.
There are, however, certain exceptions to this distinction between the
obligations of abstention imposed upon a neutral state with respect to its
own actions and the absence of any obligation to prevent similar acts when
performed by private individuals within neutral jurisdiction. One such
exception may be seen in Article 8 of Hague XIII, which reads:
A neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel within its
69

In addition, the more detailed provisions of Hague XIII are not always free from ambiguity.
It is customary for writers to assume that in the event of doubt as to the meaning of these more
detailed provisions such doubt must be resolved-whenever possible-by reference to Article 5.
Although the Convention does not expressly establish this procedure, and does not specifically
create any hierarchy among its various norms, the assumption that ambiguous provisio116 may
be interpreted by reference to Article 5 is not unreasonable. But even if it is a~sumed that this
procedure is justified the result may be only to return to the general prohibition whose interpretation and application created so much uncertainty in the first place.
70 See pp. 2.09 ff.
399334-57--16

227

jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise,
or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which that
Government is at peace. It is also bound to display the same
vigilance to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any
vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, which
had been adapted entirely or partly within the said jurisdiction
for use in war. 71
In explanation of the above rule it has been stated that a vessel "intended
for operations of war is so complete a weapon of war, its departure may so
nearly amount to the use of neutral territory as a base of operations, and
its activities may be of such decisive influence, that it has now come to be
regarded as not unreasonable to require a neutral government to take upon
itself the comparatively simply duty of preventing such a vessel from
leaving its jurisdiction". 72 It is tempting to find in this explanation a still
more general basis for distinguishing between those acts of private individuals a neutral state is obligated to prevent within its jurisdiction and
those acts the commission of which does not involve the neutral's responsin Article 8 of Hague XIII is derived from the so-called ''Three Rules of Washington'', which
grew out of the Alabama controversy between Great Britain and the United States at the time
of the American Civil War. By the Treaty of Washington, May 8, r87~ the parties to the
controversy agreed upon the settlement of their differences by arbitration, and further agreed
that the arbitrators would be bound by the three rules. The first rule is practically identical
with Article 8 of Hague XIII, except that it obligated neutral governments to use "due diligence" to prevent the measures now prohibited by Article 8, whereas Article 8 uses the phrase
"means at its disposal."
72 J. A. Hall, The Law of Naval Warfare (r92.r), p. rso.-The applicability to aircraft of the
obligations embodied in Article 8 of Hague XIII is still unsettled. According to Article 46
. . of the unratified 192.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare, a neutral government must use the means at its
disposal:
"r. To prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of an aircraft in a condition to make a
hostile attack against a belligerent Power, or carrying or accompanied by appliances or materials
the mounting or utilization of which would enable it to make a hostile attack, if there is reason
to believe that such aircraft is destined for use against a belligerent Power.
"2.. To prevent the departure of an aircraft the crew of which includes any member of the
combatant forces of a belligerent Power.
"3. To prevent work upon an aircraft designed to prepare it to depart in contravention of
the purposes of this Article.''
The necessity of an "Alabama" rule for aircraft is evident, and in view of the greater adaptability of aircraft for hostile operations such a rule should be-if anything-more strict than the
present obligations imposed upon neutrals with respect to warships. Nevertheless, ·no clear
rule with respect to aircraft has yet emerged, although there can be little question that a·neutral
state in allowing aircraft to leave its jurisdiction in a condition to make a hostile attack against a
belligerent would thereby become liable to the charge that its territory had been used as a
belligerent base of operations. See Spaight, op. cit., pp. 474-7. Beyond this, however, the
obligations of the neutral state-even after World War II-remain undefined. It is relevant;
in this connection, to quote common Article 15 (paragraph 2.) of the 1938 Neutrality Regu-.
lations of the Northern European Neutrals: "Any aircraft in a condition to commit an attack
against a belligerent, or which carries apparatus or material the mounting or utilization of
which would permit it to commit an attack, is forbidden to leave . . . territory if there is
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bility. The former may be considered to consist in acts which directly
assist or strengthen a belligerent's military and naval forces; the latter
consisting only in the indirect strengthening of the belligerent's general
capacity to wage war. To a substantial degree this distinction can be
considered as well-founded in the traditional law. 73 In certain respects,
however, its applicability must remain doubtful. It is, for example, not
even entirely applicable with respect to the neutral's obligation in Article 8
of Hague XIII, for Article 8 has been interpreted by states to imply not
only the duty of a neutral to prevent the departure of vessels intended for
immediate delivery at sea to a belligerent, there to be used for hostile
operations, but also to imply the duty of a neutral state to prevent the
departure from its jurisdiction of said vessels even though they are first to
be delivered to a belligerent port in a manner similar to any other commercial transaction. Whereas the private delivery of other kinds of war
materials from a neutral state to ·a belligerent port does not involve the
responsibility of the neutral state, the same cannot be said of the delivery
to belligerent ports of a vessel intended to engage in hostile belligerent
operations and which has been adapted-in whole or in part-within
neutral jurisdiction for warlike use. 74
reason to presume that it is destined to be employed against a belligerent Power. It is likewise
forbidden to perform work on an aircraft in order to prepare its departure for the above-mentioned purpose." A.]. I. L., 32. (1938), Supp. pp. 141 ff.-It should perhaps be made clear that
the remarks in this note do not have reference to the quite different question concerning the entry
into, or subsequent departure from, neutral territory of belligerent military aircraft (see pp.
2.5 I-2.).
73 Though it certainly does not invalidate the excellent criticism of Hyde (op. cit., p. 2.2.97),
to wit: "The exportation of war material from neutral territory constitutes usually the general
strengthening of the sinews of the belligerent behind the transaction, rather than the proximate
cause of the augmentation of a unit of military power. Neutral territory is, nevertheless,
utilized as a base of belligerent supply as certainly as if a particular force such as a fleet were
the direct recipient of aid. To limit, therefore, the duty of the neutral to the case where its
territory affords aid to, or is creative of, a unit of military or naval strength capable of engaging
in immediate hostile operations, is to raise an artificial distinction which is hardly responsive
to principle or to existing conditions of warfare."-Yet despite the admitted 'artificiality' of
the distinction it remains one of the principal bases of the traditional law.
74 It is occasionally contended that a distinction must still be drawn between selling armed
vessels to belligerents and building them to belligerent order; that whereas the neutral state is
not obligated to prevent the sale of such vessels when having the character of an ordinary
commercial transaction, it is forbidden to allow building to the order of a belligerent. Thus:
"An armed ship, being contraband of war, is in no wise different from other kinds of contraband, provided that she is not manned in a neutral port, so that she can commit hostilities at
once after having reached the open sea. A subject of a neutral who builds an armed ship, or
arms a merchantman, not to the order of a belligerent, but intending to sell her to a belligerent,
does not differ from a manufacturer of arms who intends to sell them to a belligerent. There
is nothing to prevent a neutral from allowing his subjects to sell armed vessels, and to deliver
them to belligerents, either in a neutral port or in a belligerent port . . . On the other hand,
if a subject of a neutral builds armed ships to the order of a belligerent, he prepares the means of
naval operations, since the ships, on sailing outside the neutral territorial waters and taking in
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In those instances where warships are built to the order of a belligerent,
or are otherwise intended for belligerent use, the neutral's duty is clear.
Equally clear is the neutral's obligation to prevent the conversion of
belligerent merchant vessels into warships while in neutral ports. Difficulties may arise, however, in the event that belligerent merchant vessels
take on arms and war supplies for the purpose of conversion to warships
once on the high seas. Although the scope of the neutral's duty in this
latter instance is not entirely clear, it would seem that the neutral is obliged
to exercise the means at his disposal in order to prevent belligerent merchant
vessels suspected of intended conversion from receiving any war materials
while in neutral ports. Similar care must be exercised by the neutral with
respect to armed belligerent merchant vessels, if suspected of not having
used such armament solely for defensive purposes. Indeed, the far-reaching
transformation in the position now occupied by merchant vessels in relation
to a belligerent's military effort at sea-a transformation the consequences
of which are still far from being generally recognized-necessitates the
re-examination of the status to be accorded these vessels while in neutral
waters and ports. The contention that this transformation no longer
justifies the differentiation in treatment formerly drawn between the warships and merchant vessels of a belligerent must be given serious consideration. If this contention is well founded, and it will be examined in a
further section, 75 then the duties of a neutral state will be increased considerably. It is at least clear that in relation to belligerent 1nerchant
vessels the neutral's duties of prevention under Articles 5 and 8 of Hague
XIII have become increasingly wider in scope as a result of the recent
practices of belligerents.
In this connection, brief consideration may be given to one further
category of acts the commission of which by private individuals may serve
to turn neutral waters and ports into a base of operations. Although the
neutral state is under no obligation to prevent the departure of merchant vessels carrying contraband of war to the ports of a belligerent, is it obliged
a crew and ammunition, can at once commit hostilities." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit.,
p. 713. The distinction drawn by Oppenheim was relied upon in the opinion (dated August 27,
1940) of the Attorney General of the United States on the legality-under international lawof the exchange of over-age American destroyers for the lease of British naval and air bases.
For text of opinion, see A.]. I. L., 34 (1940), pp. 72.8-35· There can be little doubt, however,
that the distinction in question has almost no foundation in the practice of states.· See, for
example, the criticism of Herbert W. Briggs, who points out that ''the practice of states . . .
has overwhelmingly rejected Oppenheim's distinction since 1871, and the United States Government is on record as never having accepted it.'' ''Neglected A~pects of the Destroyer Deal,''
A.]. I. L., 34 (1940), p. 587. It may be noted further that even if the distinction made by Oppenheim could be accepted it would not have justified the destroyer-base agreement, since the
distinction refers only to the actions of neutral subjects, not to acts of the neutral state. The
latter is clearly forbidden by Article 6 of Hague XIII from engaging in such trans<l:ctions. ·
75 See pp. 247-5 r.
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to prevent the departure of merchant vessels carrying war materials intended for direct delivery to a belligerent's naval forces at sea? It should
be made clear that the question raised does not refer to vessels bearing the
formal status of auxiliary warships, or to vessels which-though not possessing this status-nevertheless act in the direct and continuous employ
of a belligerent fleet. With respect to either of these categories of vessels
there is no question, since a neutral state certainly must treat them in the
same manner as belligerent warships. 76 Under consideration here are
rather vessels-whether neutral or belligerent-not in the direct and continuous employ of a belligerent fleet but which the neutral state has reason
to believe intend to deliver certain war materials to belligerent warships.
No doubt as judged by the "standards of logic" the neutral's duty is
clear. To forbid belligerent warships from obtaining armaments and other
supplies of war in neutral ports, while at the same time allowing neutral
and belligerent merchant vessels to provide belligerent forces at sea with
these materials, would not unreasonably appear to be a patent evasion of
the principle forming the basis of the neutral's duty to prevent its waters
and ports from becoming a base of operations. Nonetheless the matter
remains unsettled in law, and it is not possible to define with certainty the
scope of the neutral's duty of prevention. In practice, however, an increasing number of states when neutral do prohibit the departure of any
merchant vessel from their ports when there is reason to believe that the
supplies carried are destined for direct delivery to a belligerent fleet. 77
But whether this practice may be declared sufficient to constitute a custom
presently binding upon neutral states must remain doubtful. 78
a. The Passage of Belligerent Warships and Prizes Through Neutral
Territorial Waters
The problem of belligerent passage through neutral waters must be disSee pp. 39-40.
During both World Wars most neutral states prohibited this practice.-The United States
Neutrality Regulations of September 5, 1939 prohibited, in paragraph 12., the "dispatching
from the United States, or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, any vessel, domestic or
foreign, which is about to carry to a warship, tender, or supply ship of a belligerent any fuel,
arms, ammunition, men, supplies, dispatches, or information shipped or received on board
within the jurisdiction of the United States." In the Neutrality Act of November 4, 1939
(section 1o) the President was given still broader powers to prevent the departure of vessels
from American ports whenever reasonable cause existed for believing that such vessels intended
to supply belligerent warships with fuel, arms or ammunition.-Common Article 14 of the
1938 Neutrality Regulations of the Northern European Neutrals provided that: "Vessels or
aircraft obviously navigating with a view to supplying the combatant forces of the belligerents
with fuel or other provisions are prohibited to take on supplies in ports ... or anchorages exceeding in quantity that necessary for their own needs." A.]. I. L., 32. (1938), Supp., pp. 141 .ff. And
to the same effect, Ar~icle 5 of the Recommendation (February 2., 1940) of the Inter-American
Neutrality Committee, A.]. I. L., 34 (1940), Supp. p. So.
78 The opinions of writers are neither consistent nor altogether clear on this point, though
the majority are reticent to assert that the practice referred to above may be considered as now
possessing a customary character.
76
77
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tinguished from the case of belligerent entry and stay in neutral waters and
ports. Article roof Hague Convention XIII provides that the "neutrality
of a power is not affected by the mere passage through its territorial waters
of war-ships or prizes belonging to belligerents," and this conventional
rule finds general support in customary international law as well. 79 In
permitting neutral states to allow the mere passage of belligerent warships
and prizes through their waters Article ro does not thereby determine what
a neutral state may forbid to belligerents. Since a neutral's rights are, in
this respect, no less in time of war than in time of peace it may place severe
restrictions upon-and probably forbid altogether-the passage of belligerent warships and prizes through its waters, or at least through those
waters that do not connect two parts of the high seas and are not used as a
highway for international navigation. 80 In imposing restrictions upon the
79

See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 443·

so See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 412. (and notes thereto), where it is pointed out that

extension of the right of innocent passage in time of peace to warships remains an unsettled
matter. It would appear that the practice of states does indicate a general reluctance to
recognize a clear right of innocent passage as extending to warships, although it is true that
under normal circumstances the denial of passage to foreign warships frequently has been
regarded as an unfriendly act. Recently, the International Law Commission, in its final
Report on the Law of the Sea, adopted nits Eighth Session (see U.N. General Assembly, Official
Records, nth Ses.r. Sttpp. No. 9 (Doc. A/3159)), dealt with the scope of the right of innocent
passage in time of peace. Article 2.4 of the Report declares that the coastal state "may make
the passage of warships through the territorial sea subject to previous authorization or notification. Normally it shall grant innocent passage subject to the observance of the provisions of Articles 17 and r8." And paragraph I of Article 17 states that the coastal state "may
take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to protect itself against any act prejudicial to its
security or to such other of its interests as it is authorized to protect under the present rules
and other rules of international law." According to Article 2.5 a warship failing to comply
with the regulations of the coastal state concerning passage through the territorial sea may
be ordered to leave such waters.
It should be fairly apparent that the argument directed against conceding any right of passage
through territorial waters to foreign warships is much stronger in time of war than during
a period of peace. The interest of a neutral state in preventing belligerent use of its waters
as a base of operations, and in preserving a strict impartiality, may well appear to dictate a
policy of prohibiting altogether the lateral passage of belligerent warships through its territorial waters. As presently noted in the .text, the passage of belligerent warships through
neutral waters is-in any event-an anamoly which finds no parallel in land or aerial warfare.
Although it has been justified by pointing out that the interests of a strict neutrality must be
qualified in this instance by the character of the sea as a highway for international navigation the argument is not impressive. There has long been a conviction that neutrals ought
to have a right to deny passage altogether to warships, and this view was given expression
at the Hague Conference of 1907. At that Conference, however, a number of states-and
particularly Great Britain-insisted upon a right of innocent passage for warships. Article
10 of Hague XIII formed a compromise between these conflicting views. During World War
I the Netherlands adopted the rule that-save in distress-belligerent warships were forbidden
either to enter or to stay in Netherlands territorial waters, though this denial of passage was
later justified against Germany by the argument that Netherlands waters did not constitute
a normal route for the navigation of German warships. Hence, the possible significance of
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passage of warships through its waters the neutral state is only required
to act impartially toward all belligerents.
Although Article 10 permits neutrals to allow belligerent warships
' ' mere passage'' through their waters it leaves unanswered several questions.
May the neutral state grant anything more than "mere passage," or does
Article Io-without expressly so stating-indicate the scope of the neutral's duty with respect to belligerent passage through its territorial
waters? In addition, if Article 10 states the scope of the neutral's dutywhich is to prevent belligerent transit through its territorial waters other
then for the purpose of'' mere passage' '-then what is the meaning of the
"mere passage" a neutral may permit? Finally, and in close connection
with the preceding question, is there any time limit imposed upon belligerent passage through neutral waters?
There would appear to be general agreement that Article 10 does define
the scope of the neutral's preventive obligation. There is less agreement,
however, upon the precise nature of the neutral's obligation to prevent
belligerent transit through its waters other than for purposes of ''mere
the Netherlands action is not altogether clear. Nevertheless, it is believed that a neutral
state would not violate international law if it did forbid passage-however innocent-through
its territorial sea to the warships of belligerents (the same position is taken in the Harvard
Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial TVar, op. cit., pp.
42.2.-4).
One clear exception to the position advanced above may be seen in the case of straits connecting two parts of the high seas and used as a highway for international navigation; here the belligerent would appear to have a right to claim innocent passage for its warships and prizes. In
the case of canals that are regulated by international agreement passage is governed by the terms
of the agreement. In either case, however, passage is subject to the right of the neutral littoral
state to take reasonable measures to secure the protection of the waterway and to insure the integrity of its neutral status. According to treaty, when the United States is neutral the Panama
Canal shall be free and open, on terms of entire equality, to the vessels of commerce and of war of
all nations observing the rules laid down in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty concluded November 18,
1901 between the United States and Great Britain. On September 5, 1939 two Executive Orders
were proclaimed setting forth the regulations governing neutrality in the Canal Zone and the
passage of warships through the Panama Canal. For texts of orders, U. S. Naval War College,
International Law Situation, I9J9, pp. 139-43. Among other things these Orders restricted belligerent passage or stay in the waters of the Canal Zone to twenty-four hours (with certain exceptions) in addition to the time required to transit the Canal, limited the number of warships of
one belligerent permitted at any one time in either port or waters to three, restricted the total
number of warships of all belligerents allowed at any one time in the Canal and the waters of
the Canal Zone to six, and prohibited warships from effecting repairs and obtaining fuel and
provisions except under written authorization from Canal authorities. Finally, a belligerent
warship was permitted to pass through the Canal "only after her commanding officer has given
written assurance to the authorities of the Panama Canal that the rules, regulations, and
treaties of the United States will be faithfully observed. "-A detailed survey of the practice of
states with respect to the passage of belligerent warships through international waterways,
when the littoral or riparian state is neutral, may be found in R. R. Baxter, "Passage of Ships
Through International Waterways in Time of War," B. Y. I. L., 31 (1954), pp. 192.-2.02..
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passage. " 81 It has been contended that the passage a neutral may permit
belligerents must be considered, both by custom as well as by convention,
together with, and restricted by, the neutral obligation to prevent its
waters from being used as a belligerent base of naval operations; that in
terms of Hague XIII Article 10 must be read along with Article s of the
Convention. According to this interpretation the "mere passage" a
neutral may permit belligerent warships must be of an innocent nature, in
the sense that it is strictly incidental to the normal requirements of navigation and not intended in any way to turn neutral waters into a bas~ of
operations. Thus the circuitous and prolonged passage through neutral
territorial waters for the ostensible purpose of avoiding combat with an
enemy has been held to fall within the prohibition-contained in Article
s-against using neutral waters as a base of operations, and for this reason
cannot be considered as constituting" mere passage" allowed in Article 10. 82
In principle, this argument would appear well founded and reasonable.
The practice of permitting belligerent warships (and prizes) to use neutral
territorial waters for passage is, in any event, an anomaly which finds no
parallel either in land or in aerial warfare. 83 Recent experience indicates
that if belligerent passage through neutral waters is to be tolerated at all
it must be kept within the narrowest of limits. At the same time, it must
be pointed out that even if it is assumed that-from the point of view of
Hague XIII-Article 10 is to be interpreted by reference to Article s (i. e.,
" mere passage" must not be so used as to turn neutral waters into a" base
There is no doubt at all, however, that the passage allowed a belligerent warship through
neutral waters does not permit taking on provisions or making repairs. But a neutral state
may allow, according to Article I I of Hague XIII, the use of neutral pilots by belligerent
warships.
82 "While according to customary International Law and to Hague Convention XIII the
neutral State is entitled to permit the passage of men-of-war through its territorial waters, the
nature and duration of such passage are governed by the overriding principle that neutral
territorial waters must not be permitted to become a basis for warlike activities of either belligerent. The prolonged use of neutral territorial waters by belligerent men-of-war or their
auxiliaries for passage not dictated by normal requirements of navigation and intended, inter
alia, as a means of escaping capture by superior enemy forces must, therefore, be deemed to
constitute an illicit use of neutral territory which the neutral State is by International Law
bound to prevent by the means at his disposal or which, in exceptional cases, the other belligerent is entitled to resist or remedy by way of self-help." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit.,
pp. 694-5. A substantially similar view has been taken by the majority of British writers.
For the position of the British Government in the Altmark incident, see pp. 2-37-8.
83 See, for example, the observations of Hyde (op. cit., p. 2-312), who considers the present use
belligerents may make of neutral waters as "grotesque and unrealistic," and also suggests that
"passage of belligerent vessels of war through neutral waters should, by general agreement,
be greatly restricted, if not entirely forbidden." Also B. M. Telders-, "L'Incident De L'Altmark," Revue Genlrale De Droit International Puhlic, 68 (1941-45), p. 100, who suggests that the
moral of the Altmark incident, considered below, is to support the belief that the prohibition.
of entry to belligerent warships into neutral waters-save in case of distress-is the best means
of insuring the neutrality of non-participants.
8l
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of operations " ), this will result only in raising the question-the answer
to which is hardly self-evident-as to when belligerent transit through
neutral waters does clearly cease to be "mere passage" and constitutes
instead the use of such waters as a base of operations. Apart from the express prohibition aheady contained in Hague XIII, the nature of the acts
that may be regarded, when performed by belligerent warships, as turning
neutral waters into a base of operations has admittedly long been a matter
of controversy and uncertainty. If the answer to this question may not
be found in the provisions of Hague XIII, it is still less probable that it
will be found in the customary law; for it is the latter that has always
provided so much uncertainty as to the specific meaning to be accorded
the phrase "base of operations." The interpretation is not altogether
excluded, therefore, that passage through neutral territorial waters, although undertaken in order to avoid an enemy, "does not diminish the
privilege of using the territorial waters for transit." 84
Whether or not any time limit is imposed upon the "mere passage"
neutrals may permit to belligerent warships forms a related, though some84 Edwin Borchard, "Was Norway Delinquent in the Case of the Altmark," A.]. I. L., 34
(I94o), p. 2.94. Other writers share this opinion; e. g., Erik Castren (op. cit., p. 5I5) asserts
that: "Warships entering neutral waters in order to escape from the enemy may also pass
through them." This position hardly seems sustainable, however, if passage through neutral
waters also involves following a circuitous route having no reasonable relation to normal
requirements of navigation. But the matter may not always be so clear-cut. What if belligerent passage through neutral waters does conform to ordinary navigational requirements?
May it nevertheless be regarded as exceeding "mere passage" if it serves eith~r to confer a direct military advantage upon a belligerent or to result in endangering the peace and security
of the neutral state? Belligerent passage through neutral waters always forms a part of naval
operations and therefore can always be interpreted as conferring some sort of advantage upon
the belligerent which makes use of neutral territorial waters. It may prove next to impossible
to determine whether or not passage does serve in a concrete instance to confer a direct military advantage (or, put in other terms, whether or not passage serves to turn neutral waters
into a base of operations). This is particularly so when passage conforms to ordinary navigational requirements. Of course, it may be argued-as a number of writers have so arguedthat the legitimacy of passage is determined not only by the specific use to which neutral waters
may be put but also by the degree to which passage-whatever its actual purpose-may
endanger the peace and security of the neutral state. This latter criterion is a significant one
and ought not to be confused with the base of operations criterion. Although the use of neutral waters as a base of operations necessarily endangers the peace and security of the neutral
the converse proposition is not always the case. The peace and security of the neutral state
may be endangered by belligerent passage, but such passage clearly need not constitute the use
of neutral waters as a base of operations. From this point of view, passage is no longer "innocent" (and hence no longer "mere passage") if it is likely to result in tempting an enemy to
take hostile measures in neutral waters. One obvious difficulty here, however, is that the
determination of the "innocence" of passage may thereby be left in practice to the initiative
of the belligerents, since the latter have only to react adversely to an enemy's passage through
neutral waters and the consequence will be to endanger the peace and security of the neutral
state.-Admittedly, the preceding remarks raise difficult-and as yet unsettled-questions.
Nor is it likely that these questions will ever be resolved satisfactorily short of clear change in
a rule that has long been an anachronism in the law of neutrality.
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what subsidiary, question. In terms of Hague XIII this latter question
concerns the relation of Article 10 to Article 12.. Article 12. states:
In the absence of special provisions to the contrary in the legislation of the neutral Power, belligerent ships of war are forbidden
to remain in the ports, roadsteads or territorial waters of the said
Power for more than twenty-four hours, except in cases covered by
the present Convention.
The problem is essentially that of determining whether or not Article 10
is one of the "cases covered." Either interpretation is possible, and it
would therefore appear that the matter of determining the time li1nit to
be allowed for passage through neutral waters must be left to the decision
of the neutral state concerned. In general, the practice of neutral states
has been to limit belligerent passage to a period not exceeding twenty-four
hours. 85 But it should be emphasized that whatever length of period the
neutral state may establish for the passage of belligerent warships through
its waters this cannot affect the nature of the passage allowed. H belligerent passage has a character other than that of ''mere passage,'' provided for in Article 10, it is forbidden for any period of time. On the other
hand, it is not unreasonable to contend that the length of the period of
passage-i. e., a prolonged use of neutral waters-is itself one indication
of the purposes for which transit is made.
The difficulties involved in interpreting the scope of the neutral's duty
in regulating belligerent transit through its territorial waters were strikingly illustrated during the second World War in the Altmark incident.
On February 14, 1940, the German naval auxiliary vessel Altmark entered
Norwegian territorial waters on a return trip from the South Atlantic to
Germany. The vessel carried almost three hundred captured British seamen on board, a fact which, in itself, had only a limited relevance to the
principal legal issues involved. The German auxiliary was granted permission by the Norwegian authorities to navigate through the latter's
territorial waters. At the same time the Norwegian authorities refused
the request made by the con1mander of British naval forces in the area
that the Altmark be searched in order to determine whether she carried
British prisoners. On February 16, 1940, after the Altmark had passed
through approximately four hundred miles of Norwegian waters, a British
85 Seep. 2.41 (n).
In the regulations of many neutral states no attempt has been made to distinguish clearly between the time allowed for passage through neutral waters and the period
governing entry and stay in neutral waters and ports. Thus the United States Neutrality Regulations of September 5, 1939 declared: "If any ship of war of a belligerent shall, after the time
this notification takes effect, be found in, or shall enter any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, such vessel shall not be permitted to remain
in such port, harbor, roadstead, or waters more than twenty-four hours, except in case of stress
of weather, or for delay in receiving supplies or repairs, or when detained by the United States
. . . '' The preceding regulation was interpreted, however, as applying both to passage through
territorial waters as well as to stay in port.
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destroyer entered these waters and forcibly released the prisoners held on
board the German vessel. No attempt was made by the British destroyer
carrying out the action either to capture or to sink the Altmark. 86
In justification of the British action in the Altmark case it has been urged
that Norway failed to comply with the obligations of neutrality by not
conducting a proper investigation into the nature and object of the Aftmark's voyage and of the use to which she was putting Norwegian territorial waters. 87 Still further, it has been argued th~t, in taking an extremely
86 A brief summary of the Altmark incident, and part of the diplomatic correspondence provoked by the incident, are given in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 568-75. The texts of
the notes exchanged between Great Britain and Norway during the period extending from
February I?, I940 to March I5, I940 were published in I950 by Great Britain (Norway No. I
(I95o), Cmd. Son.). In an abundant literature the clearest, and most detailed, exposition of
the legal issues raised by the case-though reflecting the British position-has been given by
C. H. M. Waldock, "The Release of the Altmark's Prisoners," B. Y. I. L., 24 (I947), pp. 2.I6-38.
Upon entering Norwegian waters the Altmark was hailed by a Norwegian naval vessel which
confined itself to an examination of the Altmark' s papers. Although a number of writers have
concentrated upon the question of the precise status of the vessel there was no disagreement
between Great Britain and Norway on this point. The Altmark was a German naval auxiliary,
listed as such by Germany, and entitled to be treated in a manner similar to any other warship.
Prior to her return voyage from the South Atlantic she had operated with the Graf Spee, and
indeed the British prisoners she carried on board were taken from ships sunk by the Graf Spee.
Nor could there by any question about the plainly circuitous nature of the Altmark's voyage,
since during the course of her initial examination the captain had stated that the Altmark was
on her way from Port Arthur, Texas, to Germany. On the second day of passage another
Norwegian naval vessel sought to inspect the Altmark but the request was refused. In response
to questions put to him the captain of the Altmark denied carrying any nationals of another
belligerent. When asked why the Altmark had earlier violated Norwegian neutrality regulations by making use of her wireless the captain responded that he was unaware of any prohibition against such use. During the greater part of her passage through Norwegian warers
the Altmark was escorted by Norwegian naval vessels.
87 The precise nature of this particular argument should be thoroughly understood. Initially,
much was made of the fact that the Altmark was carrying prisoners of war, and in its earlier
notes and public statements the British Government weakened its position considerably not
only by its almost exclusive concentration upon this aspect but also by giving the impression
of contending that the passage of a belligerent warship through neutral waters was unlawful
if the Wf.rship carried prisoners of war. However, a belligerent may enter neutral waters and
ports even though carrying prisoners of war on board and this fact in itself does not legally
alter the position of the vessel or the obligations of the neutral. Provided that the Altmark's
passage through Norwegian waters was in accordance with international law and Norway's
neutrality regulations there was no duty on Norway's part to object to the transport of prisoners
through her waters. The duty to release prisoners of war held on board a warship follows
only upon the act of interning the warship for violation of neutral waters. (It is also possible
that, exceptionally, the release of prisoners may occur in other circumstances. Thus the
Uruguayan Government released the prisoners held by the Graf Spu, as a condition for granting
the Graf Spee a seventy-two hour stay in Montevideo for the purpose of making repairs to
damage incurred in battle. But it would be premature to draw any conclusions from this one
incident.) Hence Norway's duty to release the British seamen held on board the Altmark
would arise only as a result of interning the vessel for unlawful use of Norwegian waters.
The decisive point, therefore, concerned the nature of the Altmark's passage-i.e., its legality
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circuitous route which involved making prolonged use of Norwegian
waters for the evident purpose of avoiding capture by British forces, the
Altmark's passage went far beyond the "mere passage" a neutral state 1nay
grant belligerent warships under Article ro of Hague XIII. Given these
circumstances, the passage of the Getman auxiliary vessel amounted to
the use of N 01 wegian waters as a "base of operations," within the meaning of Article 5 of the same convention. Hence, Norway had the duty
either to intern the vessel and to release the prisoners, or, at the very
least, to order the Altmark out of Norwegian waters. 87a
or illegality-and the later British note of March 15, 1940 properly emphasized this point.
At the same time, the note of March 15th insisted that a neutral was obliged to take those
measures necessary to insure that belligerent warships do not make improper use of its waters.
The final British position concentrated then upon two principal legal arguments. The first
concerned what may be termed the extent of the investigative measures a neutral must take to
ensure the integrity of its waters, whereas the second dealt with the problem of what actually
constitutes belligerent misuse of these waters under the guise of "mere passage." Great
Britain contended that the Norwegian Government in allowing its attempts at further investigation of the Altmark to be frustrated had violated its neutral obligations, that the refusal by
the captain of the Attmark to permit the search of his vessel obligated Norway to order the
Altmark out of Norwegian waters. Search of the Altmark would have revealed the presence of
prisoners, and although the transport of prisoners through neutral waters is not in itself unlawful their transport under these particular circumstances would have enabled Norway to judge the
true nature and purpose of the voyage-hence its unlawful character. Instead, the British note
pointed out, Norway contented itself not only with making a very inadequate investigation
but even went out of its way to facilitate the Altmark's voyage.
The Altmark incident thus raised the general question as to what measures-if indeed anyof an investigative character a neutral is bound to take with respect to belligerent warships
entering its waters. More specifically, does a neutral have a duty-as well as a right-to
search a warship in circumstances raising reasonable doubt as to the legitimacy of the use to
which neutral waters may be put. In the Altmark case Norway insisted that the peacetime
immunity accorded foreign warships was equally applicable in time of war and that the Altmark
was merely exercising this right of immunity when she turned down the Norwegian request
to search the vessel. This position is hardly conducive to an effective neutrality, however,
which would rather appear to require that an exception be made to the normal immunity
granted foreign warships. Certainly there is much to be said for the view "that a neutral
state which has bona fide reasons for questioning a particular use of its waters by a belligerent
warship has both the right and the duty to investigate the ship's activities, even to the extent
of a reasonable inspection of the ship itself." Waldock, op. cit., p. 2.2.1.
87a Professor Waldock's (op. cit., p. 2.35) conclusions are as follows:
"(a) Norway's view that passage is covered only by Article 10 and is not touched by the
2.4 hours' rule of Article 12. ought not to be accepted. Norway was therefore jn default in
permitting the Altmark's passage to exceed 2.4 hours.
·
"(b) The Altmark's circuitous passage to escape attack was not 'mere passage' within the
meaning of Article 10, but a use of Norwegian waters for defensive naval operations contrary
to Article 5· Norway was therefore in default in allowing such passage at all.
"(c) Even if a breach of Article 5 is not regarded as conclusively established under the
existing rules of international law, the Altmark's use of Norwegian waters was undeniably for
refuge as well as for passage. In these circumstances it was inadmissible for Norway to regard
the Altmark's passage as 'mere passage' within the meaning of Article 10, and accordingly
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Whether the hostile action taken by Great Bri tain within N orwegian
waters was justified, even under the assumption that Norway was clearly
derelict in her neutral duties, may receive separate consideration. 88 Here
it is relevant only to observe that the contention that the Altmark' s use of
neutral waters did not constitute ''mere passage,'' but rather the use a.f
neutral waters as a base of operations, was not without substantial foundation. In retrospect, the Altmark case serves to emphasize once again tha.t
a belligerent will not readily accede to his enemy's use of neutral wate1·s
for purposes other than those strictly incidental to .the normal requirements
of navigation. And although the matter cannot be regarded as conclusively settled it is probable that the present scope of the neutral's duty is
such that it must prevent passage through its waters by belligerent warships when such passage has as its purpose the use of these waters as a
refuge from enemy forces.
Norway ought at least to have limited her use of Norwegian waters to 2.4 hours under
Article r 2.. "
The difficulty with Professor Waldock's last point (c) is that it simply assumes that belligerent
passage cannot constitute the "mere pass::~.ge" permitted under Article ro if it is motivated by
reason of seeking refuge. Yet it is just this point that-however reasonable-cannot be
regarded as self-evident. Nor is the first stated conclusion (a) compelling, since the relation
between Articles ro and 12. allows either interpretation-as already noted-thus leaving it to
the neutral to regulate the time limit allowed for passage through its waters. Waldock further
argues that: "Norway, in its Neutrality Regulations, including that concerning the 2.4 hours'
rule, made no distinction between entry for passage and entry for other purposes, but the
evidence seems to point to the conclusion that Norway intended this provision not to apply
to passage-as was shown in the City of Flint incident." (On the City of Flint, seep. 2.46(n)).
These points are believed to be somewhat peripheral, however. The central legal issue raised
by the Altmark incident, and which forms Professor Waldock's second conclusion, is clear:
are belligerent warships permitted-for any period of time-to use neutral waters for circuitous
passage in order to escape from enemy forces? The argument Professor Waldock offers in support of a negative reply to this decisive question is not easy to refute.
In Great Britain's note of March rs, 1940 the British Government reiterated its belief that
" mere passage" must be interpreted to mean "innocent passage," and the latter was defined
as "passage through such territorial waters as would form part of a ship's normal course from
the point of her departure to her destination, and in particular through such territorial waters
as form part of straits which provide access from one area of the sea to another." On the
relation between Articles ro and 12. the note went on to declare that: "His Majesty's Government regard the question of passage through territorial waters as governed by Article ro of the
Convention [Hague XIII] and not by Article 12., and, in their view, the time limit of passage
is not the fixed one of 2.4 hours prescribed by the latter Article but that which results from the
very nature of 'innocent passage' . . . but Article 12. is at any rate a refutation of the contention that no time limit exists if the ship does not enter a port or anchorage, and the existence
of this general prohibition, applicable to both ports and territorial waters, reinforces the view
which His Majesty's Government hold as to the nature of the passage which is permitted by
Article ro.
88 Seep. 2.62.(n).
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b. Belligerent Stay in Neutral Ports and Waters
(i) Warships
It has been observed that a neutral state may prohibit altogether the
passage of belligerent warships through its territorial waters. In like
manner a neutral may place restrictions upon the entry and stay of belligerent warships in its waters, ports or roadsteads in excess of the obligations
imposed by international law, and even forbid altogether such entry and
stay. 89 It is generally recognized, however, that international practice
requires that exception be made in the neutrality regulations of states to
permit the en try of belligerent warships in dis tress. En try in dis tress rna y
result from weather or sea conditions, but it may also result from damage
incurred in battle. Even pursuit by the enemy appears to give belligerent
warships a right of entry. But this right of entry in distress cannot be
held to prejudice the measures a neutral state may take once admission into
its waters and ports has been granted. The belligerent has no right to
repair the damage he has suffered, to take on needed supplies, or to depart
freely. And in the event entry has been sought as a result of battle
damage or of active pursuit by enemy forces a neutral state that has otherwise forbidden belligerent entrance into its waters or ports may properly
intern the vessel, together with its officers and crew. 90
So far as the scope of neutral duties is concerned Hague XIII is not
entirely clear as to those circumstances-if any-in which a neutral must
forbid entry and stay to belligerent warships. Article 12. merely refers to
the time limits placed upon warships which "remain in" the ports, roadsteads and territorial waters of neutrals. Article 14 refers to the prolongation of neutral stay in beligerent ports "on account of damage or stress of
89 The right of neutral states to exclude belligerent warships from their waters and ports is
now generally recognized, though previously subject to some doubt. During the first World
War the Netherlands' Government did in fact resort to a policy of complete exclusion, exception
being made only for entry in distress and for vessels employed exclusively for humanitarian
and scientific purposes. In Harvard Draft Convention on the Rights and Dttties of Neutral States in
Naval and Aerial War (op. cit., pp. 42.5 ff.), the past practice of states is reviewed. Article 2.6 of
the Draft Convention states:
"A neutral state rna y exclude from its terri tory belligerent warships other than:
(a) Warships entering in distress; and
(b) Warships employed exclusively in scientific or humanitarian missions."
There do not appear to have been any instances during World War II in whic~ neutrals
resorted to a policy of complete exclusion.
In addition, neutrals may-without resorting to complete exclusion-place speci~l restrictions upon certain categories of belligerent warships. During both World Wars a number of
neutral states-including the United States-prohibited the entry of belligerent submarines
into their ports or waters, exception being made for distress or force majeure (in which cases t~e
submarine was required to navigate on the surface).
90 See U. S. Naval War College, International Law Sitttations, 1939, pp. 43-4. A general revi~w
of the problem of asylum in neutral ports is given in U. S. NavallVar Collegt, International Law
Situations, 1935, pp. 42.-53.
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weather. 91 Neither these nor any other prov1s1ons of Hague XIII place
restrictions upon the possible reasons for permitting entry and stay in
neutral ports. Presumably, then, the neutral state may permit belligerent
entry and stay, without liability to immediate internment, even though it
is clear that this may well serve to provide a warship wi th a place of refuge
from enemy forces. The practice of neutral states during the two World
Wars leaves little doubt as to this conclusion.92
Although there is some question as to the applicability of the twentyfour hour rule to belligerent passage through neutral w aters there is no
question as to the application of this rule to entry and stay. Unless the
neutral state expressly provides to the contrary the period of stay in neutral
ports is limited to twenty-four hours. 93 At the same time, Article 12. of
Hague XIII provides for certain exceptions to the normal twenty-four
hours' limit on the period of stay, apart from exceptions that may be
91 Article 14 reads: "A belligerent ship of war must not prolong its stay in a neutral port
beyond the period legally allowed except on account of damage or stress of weather. It must
depart as soon as the cause of the delay is at an end.
"The regulations as to the limitation of the length of time which such vessels may remain in
neutral ports, roadsteads, or waters, do not apply to ships of war devoted exclusively to religious, scientific, or philanthropic purposes."
92 It may appear inconsistent to refuse a belligerent warship passage through neutral waters,
when such passage is used in order to escape from an enemy, and yet to allow a belligerent
warship to stay in neutral ports for precisely the same reason. In part, this may be explained
by the fact that belligerent warships staying in neutral ports can be subjected to far more
effective surveillance and control by neutral authorities than would normally prove possible
with vessels passing through the neutral's territorial waters. In any event, whereas Article 10
of Hague XIII does expressly restrict passage through neutral waters to ''mere passage,'' no
specific restrictions are placed upon the possible reasons for belligerent entry and stay in neutral
ports. And it is clear that the practice of states does not yet permit the assertion that the belligerent's use of neutral ports as a temporary refuge imposes upon the neutral a duty to intern the
vessel and its crew. During World War II the Graf Speeincident (seep. 2.45(n))and analogous
cases served to emphasize rhis point.
93 Smith (op. cit., p. 154) states that: "The 'twenty-four hours rule' has now been so widely
adopted in practice that it may be taken as almost equivalent to a general rule. In its normal
application it means that the warship must leave the neutral port within twenty-four hours
of receiving notice from the neutral authority, and it is the duty of the neutral to give this
notice as soon as possible."-No instances are known of neutral states granting a normal stay
in excess of twenty-four hours during World War II. The General Declaration of Neutrality
of the American Republics, October 3, 1939, stated on this point that the signatories: "May
determine, with regard to belligerent warships, that not more than three at a time be admitted
in their ports or waters and in any case they shall not be allowed to remain for more than
twenty-four hours. Vessels engaged exclusively in scientific, religious or philanthropic missions
may be exempted from this provision, as well as those which arrive in distress." text in
A.].I.L.,34(194o),Sttpp.,p. 10. The twenty-four hour rule isequallyapplicable to belligerent
warships in neutral ports or roadsteads at the outbreak of hostilities. Article 13 of Hague
Convention XIII declares: "If a Power which has been informed of the outbreak of hostilities
learns that a belligerent ship of war is in one of its ports or roadsteads, or in its territorial
waters it must notify the said ship to depart within twenty-four hours or within the time
prescribed by the local regulations.''
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specifically provided for in the legislation of the neutral state. In the first
place, the twenty-four hours' rule does not apply to belligerent warships
devoted exclusively to humanitarian (e. g., hospital and relief vessels),
scientific, or religious purposes. 94 In addition, a belligerent warship may
have its stay in neutral ports prolonged-according to Article 14 of Hague
XIII-" on account of damage or stress of weather." Still further, the
requirement laid down in Article 16, that a minimum period of twenty-four
hours must elapse ''before the departure of the ship belonging to one
belligerent and the departure of the ship belonging to the other," may
also lead to extension of stay in excess of the normal period. 95 Finally, a
belligerent warship unable to take on the fuel otherwise permitted to it in
a neutral's port may be permitted by the neutral state to extend its normal
period of stay by an additional twenty-four hours. 96
In the event a belligerent warship either enters a neutral port in violation
of the neutral state's regulations or does not leave a port where it is no
longer entitled to remain, the neutral state is obliged to intern the vessel,
together with its officers and crew, for the remainder of the war. This
duty is a strict one, and the neutral must ensure that the measures it takes
are adequate to prevent the vessel and its personnel from leaving neutral
territory. 97
Once admitted to neutral ports or roadsteads belligerent warships are
forbidden-according to Article s-to commit any acts that might serve
to turn neutral ports into a base of operations, and it is both the right as
well as the duty of neutral states to prevent such acts. It is for this reason
that neutral states must not allow belligerent warships that have once
entered their territorial waters to communicate in any manner with bellig94

Article 14.
Articles 15 and 16.
96 Article 1 9·
97 Article 2.4 outlines the neutral's duties in this respect and may be cited in full:
"If, notwithstanding the notification of the neutral authorities, a belligerent ship of war
does not leave a port where it is not entitled to remain, the neutral Power is entitled to take
such measures as it considers necessary to render the ship incapable of taking the sea during
the war, and the commanding officer of the ship must facilitate the execution of such measures.
When a belligerent ship is detained by a neutral Power, the officers and crew are likewise
detained.
The officers and crew thus detained may be left in the ship or kept either in another ship or
on land, and may be subjected to the measures of restriction which it may appear necessary
to impose upon them. A sufficient number of men for looking after the vessel must, however,
always be left on board.
The officers may be left at liberty on giving their word not to quit t_he neutral territory without permission."
Although Article 2.4 only speaks of a neutral being "entitled" to intern, the neutral state-:as emphasized above--is also under the duty to do so. On the disposition to be made of prison·
ers of war carried on board an interned warship, seep. 12.3 (n).
95
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erent forces at sea.98 It is for the satne reason that Article 18 of Hague
XIII forbids belligerent warships to use ·'neutral ports, roadsteads, or
territotial w aters for replenishing or increasing their supplies of war
material or their armament, or for completing their crews."
More diffi~cult , however, are those questions concerning the supplies of
food and fuel belligerent warshi ps may obtain, and the repairs that may be
undertaken, in neutral ports. It may appear that the logical consequence
of forbidding belligerent warships to use neutral waters and ports as a base
of operations must be to prohibit such vessels from obtaining within
neutral waters and ports any supplies or repairs. This has not been the
case. In principle, the right of a neutral state to allow belligerent warships to take on provisions and fuel, as well as to undertake repairs, is
firmly established in the traditional law, despite the apparent inconsistency
between this freedom and the prohibition against allowing belligerents to
use neutral waters or ports as a base for conducting hostile operations. In
question is only the extent of the neutral's right to grant supplies, fuel and
repairs (or, conversely, the scope of the neutral's duty).
A review of neutral practice indicates no uniformity with respect to the
amount of supplies and fuel that may be allowed belligerent warships in
neutral ports. In practice, therefore, the matter of determining the conditions for replenishment and refueling belligerent warships would appear
to rest largely within the discretion of the neutral state-a situation that
can hardly be regarded as satisfactory. 99
llS The neutral practice of placing the most severe restrictions upon the use of radio and other
communications by belligerent warships within neutral waters and ports became almost universal in World War II.
The United States Neutrality Regulations of September 5, 1939 declared that: "All belligerent
vessels shall refrain from use of their radio and signal apparatus while in the harbors, ports,
roadsteads, or waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, except for calls of distress
and communications connected with safe navigation or arrangements for the arrival of the
vessel within, or departure from, such harbors, ports, roadsteads, or waters, or passage through
such waters; provided that such communications will not be of direct material aid to the belligerent in the conduct of military operations against an opposing belligerent. The radio of belligerent merchant vessels may be sealed by the authorities of the United States, and such seals
shall not be broken within the jurisdiction of the United States except by proper authority of
the United States. "-Substantially similar provisions were laid down in Article 12. of the
common neutrality regulations of the Northern European Neutrals. A. ]. I. L., 32. (1938)
Supp. pp. 141 ff.
99 Article I 9 of Hague XIII provides, in part, that: ''Belligerent ships of war cannot revictual
in neutral ports or roadsteads except to complete their normal peace supply. Similarly these
vessels can take only sufficient fuel to enable them to reach the nearest port of their own country.
They may, on the other hand, take the fuel necessary to fill up their bunkers properly so called,
when in neutral countries which have adopted this method of determining the amount of fuel
to be supplied." But neither Article 19 nor-for that matter-Article 2.0 ("Belligerent ships
of war which have taken fuel in a port of a neutral Power can not within the succeeding three
months replenish their supply in a port of the same Power") can be considered conclusive
statements of the present law.-Article 10 of the 192.8 Habana Convention on Maritime Neu-
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Equally unsettled is the question of the repairs a neutral may permit
belligerent warships to 1nake while in its ports. Article 17 of Hague
Convention XIII merely states that belligerents "can carry out only such
repairs as are absolutely necessary to render them seaworthy, and cannot
add in any manner whatsoever to their fighting force. The neutral authorities shall decide what repairs are necessary and these must be carried out
with the least possible delay." No distinction is made between the causes
of damage for which repairs are made absolutely necessary. It is altogether
possible, then, to interpret Article 17 as permitting a neutral to allow
belligerent warships to make repairs which result from damage incurred in
battle. A warship does not necessarily add to its "fighting force" any
more by repairing damage due to enemy fire than by repairing damage due
to the sea. Nor does Article 14 clarify the matter in any real way, since in
allowing a belligerent warship to extend its stay in port "on account of
damage" no specification is made as to the causes of damage. Hence,
taking Articles 17 and 14 together it is entirely plausible to interpret Hague
XIII as permitting the repair of battle damage in neutral ports, and as
further permitting belligerent warships to remain in neutral ports for a
period in excess of twenty-four hours in order to effect such repairs.
In practice, the tendency of many states when neutral has clearly been
toward restricting the repairs belligerents may make in their ports and of
forbidding altogether the repair of damage that has been incurred in
battle. 1 But it is more than doubtful that the law presently forbids the
trality allows the neutral to establish the conditions for replenishing and refueling, and in the
absence of neutral regulations permits belligerent warships to "supply themselves in the manner
prescribed for provisioning in time of peace."-The actual practice of states has been less diverse
than might be anticipated. During World War II many of the neutrals-including the United
States, the Northern European Neutrals and a number of the Latin American countries-allowed
replenishing supplies of food to that of peacetime standards and refuelling in quanti ties
sufficient only to carry the vessel to the nearest port of her own country (or, in certain cases,
to the nearest port of an ally).
1 Article 9 of the 1928 Habana Convention on Maritime Neutrality provided that:
"Damaged belligerent ships shall not be permitted to make repairs in neutral ports beyond
those that are essential to the com.inuance of the voyage and which in no degree constitute
an increase in its military strength.
Damages which are found to have been produced by the enemy's fire shall in no case be
repaired.
The neutral state shall ascertain the nature of the repairs to be made and will see that they
are made as rapidly as possible."
The United States Neutrality Regulations of September 5, 1939 declared, with respect to
repairs: "No ship of war of a belligerent shall be permitted, while in any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to :make repairs beyond those
that are essential to render the vessel seaworthy and which in no degree constitute an increase
in her military strength. Repairs shall be made without delay. Damages which are found tq
have been produced by the enemy's fire shall in no case be repaired." Similarly, the neutrality
regulations of the Northern European Neutrals during World War II prohibited the repair of
damage incurred in battle.
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repair of battle damage in neutral ports, and, in fact, some states when
neutral still allow such repairs. 2 Here again the only conclusion possible
is that, as matters now stand, the scope of the neutral's duties are only
vaguely defined. In permitting belligerent warships to repair damage
incurred at sea the neutral state retains a large measure of discretion, despite the injunction to permit only such repairs as are absolutely necessary
to render belligerent '\-Varships seaworthy. 3
(ii) Prizes
The entry and stay of prizes in neutral ports are dealt with in Articles
2I, 22, and 23 of Hague Convention XIII.
In many respects, the position
of belligerent prizes in neutral ports is similar to that of belligerent warships. Nevertheless, there remain certain differences that require brief
consideration.
As illustrated by the incident involving the German battleship Admiral Graf Spec. See
Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 45o-1. On December 13, 1939, the Graf Spee entered the
Uruguayan port of Montevideo, following an engagement with British naval forces. A request
was made to the Uruguayan authorities to permit the Graf Spee to remain fifteen days in port
in order to repair damages suffered in battle and to restore the vessel's navigability. The
Uruguayan authorities granted a seventy-two hour period of stay. Shortly before the expiration of this period the Graf Spec left Montevideo and was destroyed by its own crew in the Rio
de la Plata. The British Government, while not insisdng that Article 17 of Hague XIII clearly
prohibited the repair of battle damage, did point to the widespread practice of states when
neutral in forbidding the repair of battle damage in their ports. In accordance with this
practice it was suggested that the Graf Spee' s period of stay be limited to twenty-four hours.
Uruguay maintained, however, that the scope of the neutral's duty required it only to prevent
those repairs that would serve to augment the fighting force of a vessel but not repairs necessary
for safety of navigation.-The incident is noteworthy as an example of the extent to which
belligerents seemingly can make use of neutral ports without violating the prohibition against
using neutral territory as a base of naval operations.
3 "May one say that a neutral state may sanction such repairs as they are needed to make a
vessel seaworthy, but not such further repairs as may be needed to make her 'fightworthy' ."
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 709. Kunz (op. cit., pp. 2.45154) would go further still and
apply the distinction between "seaworthiness" and "fightworthiness" to food and fuel as well
as to repairs. It is evident, however, that in a great number of cases to make a vessel seaworthy
is, in effect, to make her fightworthy. And Hyde (op. cit., p. 2.2.69) correctly observes that:
"In a strict sense, any repairs productive of seaworthiness, irrespective of the cause of damage,
necessarily increase the fighting force of the recipient if it is otherwise capable of engaging in
hostilities." Articles 34 and 36 of the Harvard Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral
States in Naval and Aerial War (op. cit., pp. 462. ff.), are indicative of the dissatisfaction felt with
respect to the present rules governing refuelling and the making of repairs in neutral ports.
Whereas Article 34 stipulates that "a condition of distre~s which is the result of enemy action
may not be remedied and if the vessel is unable to leave it shall be interned," Article 36 declares
that the neutral state shall not allow belligerent warships (other than vessels devoted exclusively
to scientific or humanitarian purposes) "to take on any supply of fuel or otherwise to augment
its fighting strength." Neither draft article can be said to be declaratory of existing law,
though they are, as the commentary points out, "expressive of a view, which has been reflected in some international practice, that any aid afforded to belligerent warships in neutral
ports does in reality compromise the neutrality of the State'' (p. 477).
2
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Article 21 declares that a prize may be brought into a neutral port "only
on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or provisions," and that it must leave "as soon as the circumstances which justified its entry are at an end." In enumerating the possible reasons for the
entry of prizes into neutral ports Article 21 is-if anything-more restrictive than the provisions dealing with the reasons for entry of belligerent
warships. 4 And if a prize is brought into a neutral port for reasons other
than those described above it is the duty of the neutral state-according to
Article 22-to release the prize, together with its officers and crew, and to
intern the prize crew. 5 The same duty falls upon the neutral state in the
event that a prize will not leave a neutral port once the circumstances which
justified its entry are at an end.
So much is clear. The difficulty is created by Article 23 in that it allows
a neutral state to permit belligerents to send prizes to a neutral's ports
"there to be sequestrated pending the decision of a prize court." It is
evident that this provision, if widely accepted by neutral states, would
serve to restrict the effectiveness of Articles 21 and 22 and would provide a
neutral state permitting sequestration in its ports with an important
opportunity for assisting the naval operations of belligerents. Article 23
has never been accepted by several of the rna jor naval powers, however,
and during the two World Wars practically all neutral states did in fact
forbid belligerents from laying up prizes in their ports pending the decisions
of prize courts. 6 At the same time, it cannot as yet be said that the practice
4 Thus Article 2.1, taken by itself, excludes the use by prizes of neutral ports as a temporary
refuge from a pursuing enemy, although such use is not prohibited to warships. In fact, whereas
belligerent warships may enter neutral ports for any number of reasons, without becoming
liable to internment, prizes are limited to those reasons specified in Article 2.1 (excepting, for
the moment, Article 2.3).
5 Thus when on November 4, 1939 the Norwegian Government released the American
merchant vessel City of Flint, together with its officers and crew, and interned the German prize
crew, it clearly acted in accordance with Articles 2.1 and 2.2. of Hague XIII. The entry of the
City of Flint into Haugesund on November 3, 1939 was not justified by reason of any of the circumstances laid down in Article 2.1. During the previous month the vessel had put into the
Norwegian port ofTromsoe for fresh water·and had been allowed to depart after having taken
on needed supplies. The City of Flint had then proceeded to the Russian port of Murmansk
where Soviet authorities after having first interned the German prize crew and informed the
American captain of the City of Flint that he might at once take the vessel out, later. reversed
this decision and placed the German prize crew again in charge. Although the ep~sode at
Murmansk remained obscure it is evident that the Germans had no valid reason for putting
into the port and that the Russian authorities were thereby derelict in their neutral duties in
not releasing the vessel and its crew, and interning the German prize crew. The incident,
together with diplomatic correspondence, is summarized in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII,
pp. 482.-8. Other accounts are given in Hyde, op. cit., pp. 2.2.77-82. and U. S. Naval War College,
International Law Situations, I9J9, pp. 2.4-8.
.
6 The United States, Great Britain and Japan refused to accept Article 2.3 of Hague XIII.
During World War I the position of the United States was made clear in the well-known case
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of permitting sequestration of prizes in neutral ports is forbidden to neutral
states, either through the invalidation of Article 2.3 or through the emergence of a contrary practice that may be considered sufficient to constitute
a rule of customary international law. 7
(iii) Armed Belligerent Merchant Vessels
Discussion over the status of armed belligerent merchantmen in neutral
ports has frequently suffered from the failure to distinguish sufficiently
between the scope of a neutral state's duties and . the extent of its rights.
Whereas there is legitimate room for inquiry into the present scope of the
neutral's duty in receiving armed belligerent merchant vessels into its
waters and ports, there ought to be little doubt as to the scope of a neutral's
rights. It is apparent that with respect to the merchant vessels of other
states the rights of a neutral can be no less than they are in time of peace.
Apart from the duty to accord to the merchant vessels of all states freedom
of innocent passage through its territorial waters there is no further duty
of a state to allow merchant vessels into its ports. So long as it acts
impartially a neutral may place special restrictions upon the entry and stay
of armed belligerent merchantmen or even close its ports entirely to the
latter. 8 The difficulty, of course, concerns the scope of the neutral's duties.
The obligations imposed upon neutral states by Hague Convention XIII
of the British steamship Appam.-In the United States Neutrality Proclamation of September 5,
1939, Articles 2.1 and 2.2. of Hague XIII are repeated almost verbatim.
7 Thus while Article 2.9 of the Harvard Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral
States in Naval and Aerial War (op. cit., p. 446) states that: "A neutral state shall either exclude
prizes from its territory or admit them on the same conditions on which it admits belligerent
warships," the commentary to this article observes: " . . . Article 2.3 (Hague XIII) has not
been widely adopted in practice and strong objections have been raised against it. On the
other hand, it could not be said that a neutral state would violate international law if it acted
upon the basis of Article 2.3. In this unsatisfactory state of the law, it seems permissible to
suggest a new rule for adoption . . . " (p. 448). Most writers, however critical of Article 2.3,
refrain from stating that a neutral state would violate its duties were it to permit the sequestration of prizes in its ports.
8 During the first World War the Government of the Netherlands did in fact choose to close
its ports to all armed belligerent merchant vessels. In a note of April 7, 1915 the Netherlands
Government stated that vessels provided with armament and capable of committing acts of
war would be assimilated to warships and thereafter forbidden to enter the ports and territorial
waters of the Netherlands. In reply, the British Government took the position that British
merchant vessels were armed solely for purposes of self-defense, that the law of nations permitted this measure, and that the British vessels so armed could not be regarded as assimilated
to the status of warships. Even assuming the validity of these contentions it is difficult to see
how they can limit the right of a neutral state to exclude armed belligerent merchant vessels
from its ports. This last point was emphasized by the Netherlands Government in a note of
August 15, 1917, in which it was declared that: "The law of nations does not prescribe for
neutrals the duty either of admitting armed belligerent merchant vessels within their jurisdiction, or of refusing them entry. It leaves them to determine for themselves their line of conduct
on this point." cited in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 498.-The only possible objection a
belligerent could legitimately raise would be over the neutral's denial of innocent passage
through its territorial waters to armed belligerent merchant vessels.
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expressly refer only to the entry and stay of "belligerent men-of-war"
(and prizes) in neutral waters and ports . According to the traditional law
the restrictions applicable to warships when in neutral jurisdiction are
not applicable to belligerent merchant vessels, privately owned and
engaged in trade. The latter enjoy, in principle, the same treatment in
neutral ports as the merchant vessels of other neutral states.
At the same time, there has been little disposition to deny that the
restrictions a neutral state must apply to warships in its ports and waters
apply equally to belligerent vessels which, though not qualifying as warships in the formal sense and therefore not competent to exercise belligerent
rights at sea, 9 directly assist a belligerent's naval operations. Thus a
belligerent merchant vessel serving in the employ and acting under the
direction of belligerent warships must be treated by neutral states in a
manner similar to belligerent warships. 10 The reason for this similarity
9

See pp. 38--4o.
The vessels referred to in the text are not "auxiliary warships" in the strict sense of that
term, that is they are not commissioned naval vessels, commanded by commissioned naval
officers and flying the naval ensign. With respect to the latter there is no doubt that they
are warships within the meaning of Hague Convention XIII, even though they merely perform
auxiliary services to fighting vessels (i. e., supply tenders, colliers, transports). In question
here is the status of vessels that perform the same auxiliary services to warships though not
formally incorporated into the naval force~ of a belligerent. In British practice these vessels
are known as "fleet auxiliaries;" they do not fly the flag of a warship nor are they competent
to exercise belligerent rights at sea. Nevertheless, with respect to neutrals they are in the same
position as warships.
When the United States has been neutral, merchant vessels serving as auxiliaries to warships
have been subject to the same restrictions as warships. Thus on November 8, I9I4 the German
steamship Locksun was interned at Honolulu for not having conformed to the rules governing
warships. The Locksun served as a supply ship for the German warship Geier. The details
of the incident are given in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. so6-8. The United States neutrality regulations of September 5, I939 provided that: "The provisions of this proclamation
perfaining to ships of war shall apply equally to any vessel operating under public control
for hostile or military purposes."
During World War II the incident involving the German merchant vessel Tacoma provided
a further illustration of the treatment accorded by neutrals to merchant vessels serving, in
effect, as a naval auxiliary to a belligerent's forces. The Tacoma was found to be acting in
the capacity of an auxiliary to the German battleship Graf Spec. For this reason the Uruguayan
Government gave the Tacoma, upon putting into Montevideo on December 30, I939, twentyfour hours within which to depart or suffer internment. On January I, I940 the vessel was
interned.-In the General Declaration of Neutrality of the American Republics, approved
October 3, I939, it was declared that the American Republics "may submit belligerent merchant
vessels, as well as their passengers, documents and cargo, to inspection in their own ports;
the respective consular agent shall certify as to the ports of call and destination as well as to the
fact that the voyage is undertaken solely for purposes of commerical interchange. They may
also supply fuel to such vessels in amounts sufficient for the voyage to -a port of supply and call
in another American Republic, except in the case of a direct voyage to another continent,
in which circumstances they may supply the necessary amount of fuel. Should it be proven that
these vessels have supplied belligerent warships with fuel, they shall be considered as auxiliary
transports." A.]. I. L., 34 (1940), S~tpp, p. II.
1°
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in treatment may be attributed to the obligation imposed upon the neutral
state to prevent its waters and ports from becoming a belligerent base of
operations; an obligation that would be seriously restricted if the latter w ere
free to permit merchant vessels serving as auxiliaries to warships to make
unlimited use of neutral ports.
These observations would appear to bear directly upon the scope of the
neutral's duties with respect to armed belligerent merchant vessels . The
fact that such vessels do not possess the status of w arships need not prove
decisive in determining the treatment they must receive while in neutral
\Vaters and ports . It is rather the use to which the vessel's armament has
been, or clearly will be, put that must form the guiding consideration. If
such use is for offensive purposes the neutral state is obliged to assimilate
armed belligerent merchant vessels to the position of warships. To act
otherwise would result in turning neutral jurisdiction into a base for the
belligerent's naval operations. 11
It is in the application of this princi pie to armed merchant vessels that
difficulties have arisen. The belligerent state that has armed its merchant
vessels will naturally insist-as did Great Britain in both \Vorld Warsthat such armament is only intended for defensive purposes, and will rely
upon the long established practice under which defensively armed merchantmen have enjoyed the same treatment while in neutral ports as given to
other merchant vessels. The neutral state, on the other hand, must run
the risk of being charged with unneutral conduct if it is established that
the armed merchant vessels it has received in its ports, and treated as
ordinary merchant vessels, have in fact been used for offensive operations
at sea. 12 Neutral states have not been insensitive to the liability they may
thereby incur, and the attempt has therefore been made to establish criteria
that would enable the neutral state to determine-in the absence of other11

In the course of the prolonged diplomatic exchange between the United States and Great
Britain during the years 1914-16 the principle enunciated above was not subject to dispute.
In a lengthy memorandum of March 2.5, 1916 the Department of State declared, in part, that:
"Merchantmen of belligerent nationality, armed only for the purposes of protection against
the enemy, are entitled to enter and leave neutral ports without hindrance in the course of
legitimate trade. Armed merchantmen of belligerent nationality, under a commission or
orders of their government to use, under penalty, their armament for aggressive purposes, or
merchantmen which, without such commission or orders, have used their armaments for aggressive purposes, are not entitled to the same hospitality in neutral ports as peaceable armed
merchantmen." cited in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 495·
12 It has been stated that neutral states "are under no imperative necessity to ascertain, at
their peril, the nature and purpose of the armaments of the merchant vessel. There seems
therefore to be no valid reason, dictated by International Law, for departing from the established practice under which defensively armed merchantmen may be admitted to neutral ports
on the same conditions as other merchant-vessels so long as there is no conclusive proof that
the particular vessel has used her armaments for the purposes of attack." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 712.. It is difficult to share this view regarding the scope of the neutral' s
duties. On the contrary, the neutral state would appear to be under the obligation to take
active measures to ascertain the nature and purpose of such armament.
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wise conclusive evidence-the offensive or defensive nature of the armament
carried by belligerent merchant vessels. 13 In practice, however, it has
proven next to impossible to establish objective criteria enabling neutral
states to draw a rational distinction between armament used solely for
defensive rather than for offensive purposes.
It is submitted that a proper perspective of the problems involved in
dealing with the status of armed belligerent merchantmen in neutral ports
and waters cannot be gained without adequate recognition of the circumstances that have so radically altered the position traditionally occupied
by belligerent merchant vessels. The nature of this transformation has
already been indicated. 14 Here it is sufficient to obesrve that the extent to
which the merchant vessels of belligerents were integrated into the military
effort during World War II left little doubt as to the purposes for which
armament would be used. There is, therefore, a distinct air of unreality in
the continued attempts to analyze the position of anned belligerent merchantmen in neutral ports and waters by the assumption of conditions which
have not obtained since the outbreak of World War I. In an earlier period
there was legitimate reason to inquire into the nature of the armament
carried by a belligerent merchant vessel. During the nineteenth century
such armament-if carried-would generally have been purchased at the
expense of the owner of the vessel, manned by members of his crew, and
used at his discretion. At present the armament of merchant vessels is
supplied by the state, manned by naval gun crews, and used in accordance
with a plan established by the military authorities of the state. Hence,
even if it is assumed that the armament of belligerent merchant vessels is
used solely for defensive purposes-and on this point there is abundant
13

It would serve little purpose to review the many attempts made to reach such determination, in the absence of direct evidence in support of the offensive nature of a vessel's armament.
During the initial stages of World War I the attempt was made to make motive the test, but it
soon became apparent that this test posed insurmountable difficulties in practice. The attempt
was therefore made to overcome these difficulties by setting out certain objective criteria which
would enable the neutral to establish the "defensive" or "offensive" nature of the armament
(e. g., number and size of guns, where mounted, how manned, and amount of ammunition).
When the first World War came to a close the problem had not yet been resolved satisfactorily,
and with the outbreak of war in 1939 it was once again taken up. Many neutral states, while
assimilating "offensively" armed belligerent merchantment to the position of warships, gave
no indication of the means to be used in determining the offensive purpose of armament. Thus
the neutrality regulations of the Northern European Neutrals merely provided, in common
Article 3, that: "Access to . . . ports or to . . . territorial waters is likewise prohibited to
armed merchant ships of the belligerents, if the armament is destined to ends other than their
own defense." A.]. I. L., JL (1938), Supp, p. 143.-In the General Declaration of Neutrality
of the American Republics, October 3, 1939, the latter agreed not to- "assimilate to warships
belligerent armed merchant vessels if they do not carry more than four six-inch guns mounted
on the stern, and their lateral decks are not reinforced, and if, in the judgment of the locaf
authorities there do not exist circumstances which reveal that the merchant vessels can be
used for offensive purposes." A.]. I. L., 34 (1940), Supp., pp. II-12.
14 See pp. 57-70.
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evidence to the contrary 15- the fact remains that such use forn1s a definite
part of the military operations of the belligerent. For this reason alone
the continued relevance of attempts to determine the defensive character
of armament must be seriously questioned. Despite these considerations,
neutral states continue to base their treatment of armed belligerent merchant
vessels upon standards that have little or no application to t he circumstances under which modern naval warfare is conducted. 16

3. Restrictions On the Use of Neutral Air Space
The numerous difficulties attending the determination of the extent to
which belligerent warships may make use of neutral jurisdiction find little
parallel in aerial warfare. The practices of states during World Wars I
and II may be regarded as having firmly established both the right as well
as the duty of the neutral state to forbid the entrance of belligerent military
aircraft into its air space. 17 In consequence, the neutral state is obliged to
use the means at its disposal to prevent the entry of belligerent military
aircraft, to com pel such aircraft to alight should they once succeed in
unlawfully penetrating neutral air space, and, once compelled to land, to
in tern the aircraft together with its crew. 18
There are, however, certain peripheral questions that have yet to be
clearly and definitely resolved. One of these questions relates to the status
of belligerent military aircraft in neutral territory at the time of the outbreak of hostilities. It has been suggested that in this instance a brief
period of grace-usually twelve hours-should be granted such aircraft,
during which period they may be permitted to leave neutral jurisdiction. 19
This suggestion follows a parallel rule applied to belligerent warships in
neutral ports, the latter being accorded a twenty-four hour period in which
Is See PP· 57-70.
Here again, the gap between the assumptions underlying the traditional law and the
conditions characteristic of modern naval warfare will serve only to defeat the purposes of
the traditional law. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the few attempts to rectify this situation have had any considerable effect. Although Article 12. of the 192.8 Habana Convention
on Maritime Neutrality declared that where "the sojourn, supplying, and provisioning of
belligerent ships in the ports and jurisdictional waters of neutrals are concerned, the provisions
relative to ships of war shall apply equally to armed merchantmen,'' this provision was not
accepted by the United States. Nor did it receive the acceptance of an appreciable number of
other American states.-Dn the outbreak of war in 1939 the Harvard Draft Convention on Rights
and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War (op. cit., pp. 435-47) suggested that: "A
neutral State shall either exclude belligerent armed merchant vessels from its territory or admit
such vessels on the same conditions on which it admits belligerent warships." The arguments
presented therein on behalf of this recommendation are believed to be sound. During World
War II, however, the general practice of neutrals was-if anything-toward a relaxation in
the attitude previously manifested toward armed belligerent merchant vessels.
17 See, generally, Spaight, op. cit., pp. 42.0 ff.
18 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 444 a, b.
19 Harvard DraftConventidn on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, op. cit.,
p. 764, Article 94 and comment.
16
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to leave these ports and neutral territorial waters. On the other hand, it has
been argued that the neutral state ought immediately to intern all belligerent military aircraft found within its jurisdiction at the outbreak of
war. 20 It does not appear possible to endorse either position at the present
time, though it is probably safe to assert that a neutral may (even if not
strictly obliged to) resort to immediate internment.
A further question concerns the entry in distress of belligerent military
aircraft. Does the duty of a neutral to prevent belligerent military aircraft
from entering its jurisdiction extend to such aircraft as are in evident
distress? Here again, no categorical answer as to the scope of theneutral's
duty seems possible, although it is doubtful that a neutral state violates
any duty in permitting entry in distress. The neutral state is bound, of
course, to intern the aircraft and its crew. Thus the matter of entry in
distress in aerial warfare must be clearly distinguished from entry in distress
in naval warfare. Whereas belligerent warships in distress enjoy a right of
entry into neutral waters and ports, the entry of belligerent aircraft within
neutral jurisdiction, even though in distress, is-at best-a matter within
the neutral's discretion. 21 In addition, whereas in naval warfare the
neutral state may or may not intern the belligerent vessel and crew seeking
entry in distress, in aerial warfare the neutral must intern the aircraft
together with its crew. 22

F. BELLIGERENT INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVATE NEUTRAL
TRADE; NEUTRAL DUTIES OF ACQUIESCENCE
It has been observed earlier that whereas the neutral state is obliged to
abstain from furnishing belligerents with a wide range of goods and services
2° Although the 192.3 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare contain no specific provision on this
point, the report of the Commission of Jurists notes-in connection with Article 42.-that the
"obligation to intern covers also aircraft which were within the neutral jurisdiction at the
outbreak of hostilities." U. S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, I924, p. 130.
21 Spaight (op. cit., p. 436) is of the opinion that the "highest that one can put the neutral
obligation is that asylum should be granted in all cases of evident distress, so far as the circum·
stances allow this obvious concession to humanitarian claims to be made. The neutral authorities remain bound, of course, to apprehend and intern the aircraft and its crew in such cases, as
well as in those of error on the part of the airmen, loss of way, or miscalculation of the exact
boundary line." -During World War II there were several reported incidents of neutral states
employing measures of force to drive away belligerent military aircraft seeking entry into
neutral jurisdiction for reasons of distress.
.
22 To the above stated rules two exceptions may be noted.
Aircraft attached to a w·arship
may enter neutral waters and ports so long as such aircraft are, and remain, in physical contact
with the warship. In this circumstance aircraft are considered merely as items in the equipment. of the vessel, and the only question is whether the vessel itself has lawfully entered neutral
jurisdiction. Finally, Article 40 of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea provides.·
that, subject to such regulations and restrictions as the neutral may see fit to apply e,qually to
all belligerents, the medical aircraft of belligerents may pass over, or land in, neutral terri tory
(see pp. 12.9-31).
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it is normally under no obligation to prevent its subjects from undertaking
these same activities. Belligerents are permitted, however, to take certain
measures to prevent the subjects of a neutral state from rendering various
forms of assistance to an enemy. The neutral state, in turn, is obliged to
acquiesce in the exercise by belligerents of repressive measures international
law permits the latter to take against neutral merchantmen engaged in the
carriage of contraband, breach-or attempted breach-of blockade, or the
performance of unneutral service. 23
23 It remains a matter of some controversy among writers as to the proper characterization
of the acts falling under the categories enumerated above. The weight of opinion in the past
has been that acts constituting contraband carriage and blockade breach ought not to be regarded as unlawful under international law but only-if at all-under national law. In large
measure, this opinion has been influenced by the consideration that international law does not
obligate neutral states to forbid their subjects from engaging in the above mentioned activities
(although a neutral state may forbid these activities on the part of its subjects). From this
point of view, the repressive measures international law permits belligerents to take against
neutral nationals undertaking carriage of contraband is a right corresponding to the neutral
state's duty of acquiescence. But the belligerent cannot complain to the neutral state for having
failed to prevent the acts in question. On the other hand, the individuals who carry contraband or undertake to break blockade are held to act at their peril; they perform a "risky" act,
though one allegedly not forbidden by international law, and if caught must take the consequences of being deprived of their property (cargo or ship, or both).
The alternate view, in holding that carriage of contraband and breach of blockade are
acts forbidden by international law, declares that it is by no means necessary that international
law obligate the neutral state to prevent the commission of these acts in order that they may
be considered unlawful. Thus a neutral national engaged in carriage of contraband may act
in accordance with the law of his state, which need not and does not prohibit the act, and yet
perform an act forbidden by international law. (In the same sense the act of piracy may be
considered as forbidden by international law, though no state is obligated either to prohibit
this act in its municipal law or to prevent its subjects from committing acts of piracy.) The
neutral state need not, and is not, obligated to prevent all acts of its subjects which belligerents
are entitled to repress (or, from this alternate point of view, to punish). Instead, it is bound
only to prevent part of them, whereas the prevention and repression of other acts are left to the
belligerents.
Although the theoretical implications of this controversy are not without a substantial
measure of interest, the practical significance of whether or not contraband carriage, blockade
breach and unneutral service are considered as acts forbidden by international law is negligible.
From both points of view the nature and extent of the measures a belligerent is permitted
to take against neutral commerce remain the same. It may be observed, however, that international law unquestionably does establish the latitude permitted belligerents in controlling
the trading activities of neutrals. Similarly, international law determines-though within
varying limits-the consequences belligerents may attach to these activities. It is true that
these consequences are realized only by virtue of judgments rendered by national prize courts,
judgments whose immediate basis must be found in municipal law. Nevertheless, in this
instance the judgment of a national prize court may properly be regarded as the application of
international as well as national law. Indeed, states are clearly under the obligation to insure
that the substantive law applied by their prize courts conforms with international law. Hence,
the application of international law is carried out through its prior transformation into national law, a transformation that ought not to be obscured for the reason that prize courts
derive their immediate power from national law and are bound to apply this law even if occasionally inconsistent with international law.
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So long as a belligerent confines the measures it takes against the trade
of neutral subjects to the limits clearly allowed by international law there
will be little occasion for controversy. Nor1nally, the relationship involved will primarily concern the belligerent and private neutral traders.
When, however, the neutral state considers a belligerent to have acted in
excess of the limits prescribed by international law, when the neutral state
considers a belligerent as endeavoring either to suppress legititnate neutral
trade or to prevent illegitimate neutral trade though by means of otherwise
unlawful measures, the matter then directly involves the duties and rights
of belligerent and neutral states. This is so for the reason that it is a duty
of belligerents to abstain from interfering with neutral commerce which international law does not regard as of such a character to justify belligerent
measures of suppression, and a right of neutral states to demand that belligerents refrain from interfering with the legitimate commerce of their subjects. In addition, even with respect to neutral trade belligerents are permitted-in principle-to suppress, neutral states have a right to insist that
belligerents employ only those measures of suppression as are sanctioned
by law.
At the same time, the belligerents' duty to abstain from the suppression
of legitimate neutral commerce is not without limitation. The neutral
state is bound not only to acquiesce in certain permitted forms of belligerent
interference with private neutral trade; it is also obliged to employ the
means at its disposal to prevent belligerent encroachment upon established
neutral rights at sea. Should the neutral state either openly permit or
tacitly acquiesce in the unlawful interference with its trade by one belligerent it cannot complain if the other belligerent-thereby placed at a
grave disadvantage-resorts to otherwise unlawful measures against
neutral trade by way of reprisal against the neutral. On this point at least
there would appear to be widespread agreement.
But beyond this point the greatest uncertainty-and controversy-exists
even today with respect to the precise scope of the belligerent's duty to
abstain from interfering with legitimate neutral commerce. In general,
belligerents have sought to qualify their obligation by contending that the
restriction of neutral rights may prove justified either as a necessary incidence to retalitory measures taken in response to the unlawful behavior of
an enemy (and even though such behavior has been directed, in the main,
only against the retaliating belligerent) or as a result of the ineffectiv~ness
of neutral efforts to prevent continued belligerent encroachment upon the
former's rights.
It should be apparent that the position of the neutral is strongest in
insisting that inter-belligerent reprisals-in the strict sense-cannot of ·
themselves provide injured belligerents with a legitimate basis for restrict-.·
ing neutral rights. The neutral state, it has been asserted, cannot be held
responsible in any way for unlawful belligerent measures that are directed
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exclusively-or even principally-against an enemy. Nor is this conclusion modified, from the neutral's point of view, by virtue of the fact
that a belligerent may be able to bring the greatest pressure to bear upon
an offending enemy through measures taken against neutral commerce.24
Even if accepted, however, the neutral's position with respect to the
legitimacy of inter-belligerent reprisals which adversely affect neutral rights
may prove of no more than limited importance. In practice, belligerents
have had a much stronger basis upon which to limit the scope of their
obligations toward the commerce of neutrals. Since the unlawful conduct
of a belligerent in warfare at sea will seldom be directed solely against an
enemy, but will bear upon neutral commerce as well, the injured belligerent
has insisted that his continued respect for neutral rights is dependent upon
the effectiveness of neutral efforts in preventing the further occurrence of
the unlawful measures imputed to an enen1y. 25
24

Hyde (op. cit., p. 2.345) gives expression to the position summarized above by stating that:
' 'It is a sound proposition that the illegal conduct of its enemy in prosecuting a war does not
excuse a response by the offended belligerent which, insofar as it returns like for like, or otherwise marks a departure from the requirements of the law, involves an impairment of obligations normally due to unoffending and non-participating powers.'' A similar view may be
found in the Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in N aval and Aetial
War (op. cit., pp. 392-4r9), where the conflicting-and frequently obscure-attitude of neutrals
and belligerents is given careful and illuminating historical review . Article 2.3 of the Draft
Convention declares: "A belligerent is not relieved of its duty to respect the rights of a neutral
State as provided in this Convention, even when engaged in acts of reprisal or retaliation for
illegal acts of its enemy." Certainly in the past this has always represented the position of the
United States when neutral. Thus the Bri tish Reprisals Order of Nobember 2.7, r939 (see p.
3r2.) brought forth the following statement by the American Government: "Whatever may
be said for or against measures directed by one belligerent against another, they may not rightfully be carried to the point of enlarging the rights of a belligerent over neutral vessels and
their cargoes, or of otherwise penalizing neutral states or their nationals in connection with
their legitimate activities." cited in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. I45·
25 In both World Wars this provided perhaps the principal belligerent argument in justification of otherwise unlawful restrictions upon neutral trade. During World War I the British
Prize Court gave expression to, and endorsed, the argument in a number of significant decisions.
In The Stigstad [r9r8]-(5 Lloyds Prize Cases, p. 393) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun..
cil, speaking through Lord Sumner, upheld the Reprisals Order of March II, r9r5, and expressly
rejected the contention that a neutral "too pacific or too impotent to resent the aggressions
and lawlessness of one belligerent, can require the other to refrain from his most effective or
his only defense against it, by the assertion of an absolute inviolability for his own neutral
trade, which would thereby become engaged in a passive complicity with the original offender."
And in a note of April 2.4, r9r6, replying to a United States protest against the Reprisal Order
of March II as being "without precedent in modern warfare," the British Government observed that if one belligerent' 'is allowed to make an attack upon the other regardless of neutral
rights, his opponent must be allowed similar latitude in prosecuting the struggle, nor should
he in that case be limited to the adoption of measures precisely identical with those of his
oponent." cited in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. I44· A substantially similar argument
has been urged by most British writers dealing with this same question. Thus : ' 'The rule that
belligerents must not interfere with the leghimate commerce of neutrals presupposes that both
belligerents will carry it out, and that neutrals will prevent both of them from violating it.
If, on the contrary, neutrals acquiesce in or are unable to prevent the violation of this rule by
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In certain respects, a parallel situation to that under present consideration
has already been dealt with in connection with the consequences arising
from the neutral's inability to prevent misuse of neutral jurisdiction. 26 It
was there observed that although a neutral state fulfills its duty if it employs the means at its disposal to prevent belligerent violation of its \Vaters
and ports, in the event these efforts prove ineffective the belligerent that
has heretofore respected neutral jurisdiction-and vvhose interests would
suffer from an enemy's unlawful acts-is not forbidden from resorting to
hostile measures against its adversary even though within neutral jurisdiction. However, these hostile measures, exceptionally permitted to a
belligerent, are not to be interpreted either as reprisals against the neutral
state or as reprisals against the belligerent that has misused neutral jurisdiction. The former interpretation is unacceptable for the reason that the
neutral state, by employing the means at its disposal, has fulfilled its duty.
The latter interpretation is misplaced for the reason that in misusing
neutral jurisdiction a belligerent commits no wrong against an enemy, and
the latter is certainly not permitted to justify hostile n1easures taken in
neutral waters by contending that he is assisting in the enforcement of the
neutral's rights. Instead, it was submitted that the correct interpretation
is simply that the scope of the belligerent's obligation to refrain from taking hostile measures within neutral jurisdiction is limited by the ability
of the neutral effectively to enforce its rights.
H the same general analysis is applied to the problem of neutral commerce-and it is difficult to see how such application may be avoided-it
may be stated that a neutral state fulfills its duty when it employs the
means at its disposal to prevent unlawful belligerent interference with the
trade of its subjects. Nevertheless, if one belligerent persists in unlawfully interfering with a neutral's trade, and the efforts of the latter prove
clearly ineffective in terminating these illegal measures, the other belligerent thereby placed at a disadvantage is no longer obliged to refrain
from taking what would otherwise prove to be unlawful measures of
interference with the neutral's trade. 27 Admittedly, the central issue
one belligerent to the vital disadvantage of the other belligerent, the latter cannot be expected
to suffer this without redress, and must be excused if, in retaliating upon the enemy, he also
violates the rule." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 679. Also see A. P. Higgins, "Retalitation in Naval Warfare," B. Y. I. L., 8 (192.7), pp. 12.9-46; H. A. Smith, op. cit., p. 145; and Higgins
and Colombos, op. cit., pp. 565-7. It should be added that Germany and France pla.ced equal
reliance upon this same argument in resorting to "reprisal" measures affecting neutral commerce.
26 See pp. 2.2.0-6.
27 The position taken in the text above is still far from being shared .by many writers, however. It should be carefully noted that, as stated in the text, this position amounts neither to·
an endorsement of the contention that inter-belligerent reprisals-in the strict sense-may .
operate to restrict neutral rights nor to an approval of the assertion that belligerents may take·
reprisal measttres against neutrals for the reason the latter are incapable of effectively enforcing
their rights. What is asserted is simply that the scope of the belligerent's obligation toward
the neutral is limited by the ability of the neutral to compel the observance of its rights. Hence
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involved here ought not to be obscured by the belligerent habit of characterizing these measures restricting neutral trade as "reprisals," ostensibly
directed against an enemy. In violating the neutral's rights a belligerent
does not, for that reason alone, violate an enemy's rights as well. Belligerents placed at a disadvantage by the unlawful measures of an enemy
that are directed against neutral trade have almost invariably -taken this
position, though the claim has no substantial justification in law. What
can be claitned, and all that can be claimed, is that the scope of the obligation imposed upon a belligerent to respect neutral rights at sea is limited-in principle-not only by the neutral's willingness to enforce its rights
but by its effectiveness in doing so. 28
At the same time, it must be conceded that in fact, if not in law, it may
prove seriously misleading to attempt to draw too close a parallel between
the hostile measures exceptionally permitted belligerents within neutral
jurisdiction and the measures exceptionally permitted to belligerents
against neutral trade. The former clearly must be limited to the forces
of an enemy; they may be taken only for an expressly defined purpose, and
once this purpose has been attained the hostile measures must cease. It is
difficult to discern similar limitations on the measures taken by belligerents
against neutral trade, owing to the neutral's inability to enforce its rights
effectively. In character and duration these measures have been held to
be subject-at best-only to the vague criteria that they conform to the
"requirements of humanity" and do not impose an "unreasonable" hardship-in the light of relevant circumstances-upon the neutral. And
whether or not belligerent measures restrictive of neutral trade do conform
it is no answer to the dilemma raised by the weak neutral to declare, as does article 2.4 of the
Harvard Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War (op. cit.,
p. 419) that: "A belligerent may not resort to acts of reprisal or retaliation against a neutral

State except for illegal acts of the latter, and a State is not to be charged with failure to perform
its duties as a neutral State because it has not succeeded in inducing a belligerent to respect its
rights as a neutral State."
28 These remarks may serve to clarify a measure of the ambiguity-and confusion-that has
so often characterized the problem of belligerent "reprisals" at sea. In part, this ambiguity
may be attributed to the belligerent insistence upon identifying interest with legal right. Undoubtedly the belligerent has a strong interest in preserving his trade with neutral states.
Nevertheless, the measures his enemy may take to shut off this trade constitute-on the wholea violation of the belligerent's rights only to the extent that the latter's merchant vessels are
rendered liable to hazards clearly forbidden by law. To the extent that unlawful measures are
directed against neutral shipping it is the right of the neutral state-not of the belligerent-that
has been violated. The belligerent possesses neither a right to demand that an enemy refrain
from unlawful measures against neutral commerce nor a right to assist a neutral in the latter's
efforts to resist an enemy's depredations at sea. In practice, it seems clear that most belligerent
"reprisal" measures have actually been a compound of measures directed against an enemy for
conduct directly injurious to the belligerent and measures restrictive of neutral rights. Whereas
the former may be considered as reprisals in the strict sense the latter may not (unless, of course,
the neutral has acted in league with the enemy).
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to these criteria is a matter the belligerent has generally insisted upon
having the sole right to determine. 29
It is perhaps for these reasons, and in view of the evident use (or, perhaps, misuse) by belligerents of "reprisals" at sea as an instrument for subverting the traditional law, that many writers continue to express serious
opposition to the position-endorsed above-that one belligerent may
resort to measures restrictive of neutral rights when the neutral proves
unable to prevent the transgressions of another belligerent. It seems clear,
though, that this opposition rna y lead to even greater difficulties in practice. Nor does this opposition, quite apart from practical considerations,
appear sound in principle. Despite the hazards admittedly implicit in
limiting the scope of the belligerent's obligation to the effectiveness of
neutral measures of prevention, there is room for insisting that belligerents
may not regard themselves at liberty to resort to any measures against the
trade of neutrals that are too weak-or too unwilling-to enforce their
rights effectively. ao

G. VIOLATIONS OF NEUTRALITY
Violations of Neutrality as Distingttished From Termination of Neutral
Status
On frequent occasions violations of neutrality have been confused with
the termination of neutral status. It would appear that the principal
reason for _this confusion rna y be traced to the tendency to identify neutrality
with the obligations imposed upon a non-participant by the traditional law.
If neutrality is to be identified with the obligations imposed upon a state
I.

29

The position taken in British prize proceedings whose basis rested upon "reprisal orders'
issued by the executive, and bearing upon neutral rights, was laid down in The Zamora [1916](4 Lloyds Prize Cases, p. 97 ), where the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council declared that
while bound to accept the Executive's statement of the facts alleged in justification of reprisal
orders the prize court's function is to determine whether or not the order in question is reasonable in the hardships it imposes upon neutrals. In neither World War were the reprisal orders
issued by the Executive found "unreasonable," and in the 1939 war neutral claimants do not
appear to have taken the trouble even to have questioned their illegality in prize court proceedings. In this connection Stone's (op. cit., p. 367) comments deserve attendon. "This check,"
he writes of the British system, "has an obvious ambiguity. Is the 'reasonableness' of the
inconvenience to be measured against the enormity of the enemy's illegality, against what is
necessary to make retaliation effective, or some other test, or against all together?· In any
case, the neutral's position is unenviably weak. The supposed proportionality of retaliation
to the original wrong is itself hardly measurable; a hardly measurable relation to this hardly
measurable proportionality is not a promising basis for a cause of action.'' Even so, the protection offered by the British system was superior to the practice of _most other belligerents.
In the case of German, Italian and French prize courts the validity of retaliatory orders affecting
neutrals does not appear to have been subject to any check, however imperfect, the courts consid-.
ering themselves bound completely by the action of the executive. See Colombos, A Treatise
on The Law of Prize, pp. 2.72.-3, 2.76-7.
3 For further reflections on this and related points, see pp. 2.96-315, where belligerent
"reprisal" measures during the two World Wars are examined in some detail.
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that does not participate in war-and particularly with the obligation of
impartiality-then it seems only logical to consider that a state in abandoning these obligations thereby abandons the status of neutrality. In the
present study, however, the usual identification of neutrality with the
duties imposed upon a neutral state has not been followed. 31 Instead, the
status of neutrality has been conceived as the non-participation of a state in
hostilities. If this latter conception of neutrality is followed the confusion
attendant upon the identification of violations c;>f neutrality with the termination of neutral status becomes clear.
A state may abstain from active participation in a war while at the same
time abandoning many of the duties imposed upon non-participants· by the
law of neutrality. In abandoning its duties the neutral state thereby
surrenders its right to demand from belligerents that behavior it would
otherwise be entitled to claim. The offended belligerent may demand
appropriate measures of redress and-should it so desire-resort to reprisals
against the offending neutral. But as long as the belligerent refrains from
attacking the neutral, and the neutral refrains from directly joining in the
hostilities by attacking one of the belligerents, a status of neutrality is
1naintained.
Rights and Duties of Netttral States In the Event of Belligerent Violation
of Neutral Rights
It is one of the peculiarities of the neutral-belligerent relationship that
a belligerent violation of neutrality serves to give rise to a right as well as
to a duty of the injured neutral state. With respect to the offending belligerent a neutral state has the right to take those measures necesssary to bring
about the immediate cessation of the unlawful acts and to demand such
action on the part of the offending belligerent as may be required to repair
the wrong that has been done. If the offending forces of a belligerent are
within neutral jurisdiction the neutral state may even resort to forceful
means in order to compel a belligerent to desist from the commission of
hostile, or otherwise unlawful, acts. Thus the neutral state has the right
to take measures necessary to effect the release of ships that have been
captured by a belligerent within neutral waters. Forcible measures may
also be taken, if necessary, against belligerent warships otherwise failing
to conform to the regulations governing passage through neutral waters as
well as entry and stay in neutral ports. If, on the other hand, the offending
belligerent forces are no longer within neutral jurisdiction the neutral state
may insist upon the performance of certain measures of reparation. Prizes
that have been seized by a belligerent in neutral waters must be restored
upon the demand of the neutral state. Nor is it excluded that if the demand for adequate measures of reparation-material or moral 32-remains
2.

See PP· I96-9.
E. g., an apology on the part of a beJligerent for the hostile acts its forces may have committed within neutral waters.
31
32

399334-57--18
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unsatisfied the aggrieved neutral n1ay resort to other, and more stringent,
measures. 33
With respect to the belligerent that has otherwise respected the neutral's
rights, the situation is somewhat more complicated. It has already been
observed that the traditional law imposes upon neutral states the duty to
employ the means at their disposal in order to prevent the violation by
belligerents of their ports or waters. 34 However, this duty relates to the
prevention of unlawful acts, not-at least not directly-to the measures a
neutral n1ust take against a belligerent for unlawful acts already committed. 35 In Hague XIII there is, apart from Articles 336 and 24, 37 no clear
guidance as to the measures a neutral state must take-if indeed any-against
a belligerent that has misused neutral ports and waters. It has been contended, therefore, that it is doubtful whether international law" imposes
upon a neutral a duty to resort to retaliatory acts in response to the illegal.
conduct of a belligerent. It is not even clear that a neutral is under a duty
to protest against illegal belligerent conduct.'' 38
Whatever merit the above opinion might once have enjoyed it would
33 Though it is very difficult to define, in a satisfactory manner, the nature and limits of the
measures available to neutrals. Certainly, the neutral state may seek to exclude altogether the
warships of the offending belligerent from entry and stay in its waters and ports. There are
also instances of neutral states placing embargoes upon the export of munitions and other
implements of war to an offending belligerent. Whether or not an aggrieved neutral may-as a
measure of retaliation-directly assist the other party to the conflict is not altogether clear,
though it wopld appear that the answer to this question must be negative.
34 See p. 2.2.0.
3 5 The strict wording of Article 2.5, Hague XIII, only obligates the neutral states "to exercise
such surveillance as the means at its disposal allow to prevent any violation" of its waters or
ports.
36 Article 3 states: ''When a ship has been captured in the territorial waters of a neutral
Power, this Power must, if the prize is still within its jurisdiction, employ the means at its
disposal to release the prize with its officers and crew, and to intern the prize crew.
If the prize is not within the jurisdiction of the neutral Power, the captor Government,
on the deamnd of that Power must liberate the prize with its officers and crew."
Article 3, paragraph 2.-on a strict interpretation-only implies the right, not the duty, of
the neutral state to demand liberation of a prize taken within its waters but no longer within
neutral jurisdiction. The United States adhered to Article 3 with the understanding that this
particular provision implies a duty on the part of the neutral state, not merely a right. In
practice, neutral states have demanded the restoration of neutral prizes seized within their
waters, and failure to do so would no doubt be regarded by the belligerent whose vessel was
seized as a dereliction on the part of the neutral state. It should be observed, howeve.r, that
the restoration of such vessels by a belligerent is made to the neutral state, not to the owner of
the vessel.
37 In strict wording, however, Article 2.4 speaks only of the measures a neutral state "is
entitled to take" against belligerent warships which do not leave a port where they are no.
longer entitled to remain, but not of measures of internment the neutral must take. Here
again, practice has established these measures as constituting not only neutral rights but ·
neutral duties as well.
38 Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Dttties of Netttral States in Naval and Aerial War, op.
cit., p. 334·
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appear that the present practice of states no longer allows the conclusion
that a neutral's duty is fulfilled merely in taking such measures as the
means at its disposal allov1 to prevent belligerent violation of its rights.
On the contrary, it would appear that the same standard that is applied to
judging the adequacy of a neutral's preventive measures must also apply
to judging the adequacy of a neutral's measures to secure the vindication of
rights that have once been violated. In failing to use the tneans at its
disposal to secure this vindication the neutral state may be regarded as
having acquiesced in the violation of its rights and thereby furnished
assistance to one side in the conflict. 39
3. Belligerent Rights In the Event of Neutral Failure to Fulfill Obligations
of Neutrality
Whereas a belligerent violation of neutrality gives rise to both a right
and a duty of the neutral state, a violation of neutrality on the part of the
neutral state merely gives rise to a right of the injured belligerent. The
decision as to whether to exercise this right or to acquiesce in a neutral's
violation of its duties is one that remains at the discretion of the belligerent.
In this respect the position of the injured belligerent differs from that of
the in jured neutral.
The remedies available to an aggrieved belligerent as a consequence of
the neutral's failure to fulfill its obligations range from the demand for
moral or material reparation to the taking of retaliatory measures. In
general, the procedure required of belligerents prior to the taking of reprisals against an offending neutral does not differ substantially from the
procedure laid down by general international law for the resort to reprisals
in time of peace. In addition to the requirement that the commission of
an act contrary to international law must precede a measure of reprisal,
the latter is normally justified only when a demand for adequate redress
has proven unavailing. It is difficult though to view this latter criterion
as a rigid requirement to be fulfilled on every occasion prior to the taking of
39 Note, for example, the view in Oppenheim-Lauterpacht (op. cit., p. 754): " . . . in case
he [i. e., the neutral] could not prevent and repulse a violation of his neutrality, the same duty
of impartiality obliges him to exact due reparation from the offender; for otherwise he would
favour the one party to the detriment of the other. If a neutral neglects this obligation,
he himself thereby commits a violation of neutrality, for which he may be made responsible
by a belligerent who has suffered through the violation of neutrality committed by the other
belligerent and acquiesced in by him." No doubt serious difficulties may arise-and have
arisen in the past-in judging whether or not a neutral state has used the means at its disposal
in exacting due reparation from an offender. These difficulties are no greater, however, than
those encountered in determining whether or not the neutral employed the means at its disposal
to prevent the commission of the unlawful acts. Distinguish, however, between the inability
of a neutral either to prevent violations of its rights or to exact due reparation, though using
the means at its disposal, and the failure of the neutral state to employ such means. Whereas
the latter may properly constitute a violation of neutrality on the part of the neutral the former
does not, despite the fact that in both cases the belligerent suffering from his enemy's
unlawful measures may be released from his obligations toward the neutral.
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reprisals. Exceptionally, the circumstances attending a neutral's failure
to fulfill its obligations may be of such a nature that the injury thereby
inflicted upon a belligerent can never be made the subject of adequate
redress. In these circumstances, it is submitted, the belligerent does not
act unlawfully even though he immediately resorts to retaliatory measures.
Finally, it is generally recognized that there 1nust be at least a rough
proportionality between the reprisal and the offense that has given rise
to the reprisal. 40
40 When judged by the above criteria it is believed that there are strong grounds for supporting
the action finally taken by Great Britain in the Altmark incident (see pp. 236-9). The Norwegian
Government clearly possessed the means either to intern the German auxiliary or to require its
abandonment of Norwegian territorial waters. Provided, then, that the Altmark's p~ssage
through Norwegian waters constituted the use of these waters as a "base of operations,"
and it is difficult to refute the soundness of this position, the refusal of the Norwegian Government to follow either of the courses of action indicated above may be regarded as a departure
from neutral duties. The precipitate character of the British action, in forcibly removing the
British prisoners held on board the Altmark, while the vessel remained in Norwegian waters,
has been defended by Waldock (op. cit., pp. 235-6) in the following terms: "A breach of the
rules of maritime neutrality in favour of one belligerent commonly threatens the security if
not the existence of the other belligerent. The breach is thus seldom really capable of being
remedied in full by subsequent payment of compensation. Nothing but the immediate cessation
of the breach will suffice. Accordingly, where material prejudice to a belligerent's interests
will result from its continuance, the principle of self-preservation would appear fully to justify
intervention in neutral waters." In the light of the relevant circumstances in the Altmark
incident there is certainly much to be said for this view, though it seems preferable-for reasons
already indicated-frankly to characterize the British action as a reprisal measure directed
against Norway for the latter's refusal to carry out neutral obligations.
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